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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
Conservative Revolutionary Intellectuals in the Weimar Republic and National Socialist 




 This thesis will examine the writings and career/life paths of three conservative 
revolutionary intellectuals during the Weimar Republic and National Socialist Germany.  
The purpose of this examination is not only to provide an overview of the development 
of conservative revolutionary thought in Germany after World War I, but also to 
investigate the influence these intellectuals had on the National Socialists’ seizure and 
consolidation of power.  The works and lives of three important intellectuals will be 
examined: Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger.  In combination with 
scholarly secondary literature, this thesis will be based mostly on translated primary 
writings.   
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 The National Socialist reign in Germany is one of the most popular areas of study 
in contemporary European History.  In retrospect, it is extremely difficult to fathom how 
an entire nation could follow a leader such as Adolf Hitler; a man who had such extreme 
and racist views.  It is difficult to grasp the concept of how a nation as modernized as 
Germany could not only let a man with such a corrupt sense of right and wrong into 
power, but then follow him blindly, and help him commit one of the most diabolical plans 
in history, the Holocaust. 
 In order to truly dissect this problem, the first step necessary is to move beyond 
the incorrect, preconceived notions that run rampant today in terms of how Hitler came 
to power, and what the actual social climate of Germany was in the early twentieth 
century.  In regards to the first problem it is a major misconception of its own to say that 
Adolf Hitler was chosen to be head of government in Germany.  It is popularly thought 
that Hitler was elected by the majority of eligible voters in Germany to be the head of 
government, but this is not true.  The most votes he and the National Socialist German 
Workers’ Party (NSDAP) earned was in the election held in March of 1933, even though 
the election was held under conditions of political duress, and the political left was 
greatly suppressed.  Another concept that is often forgotten is the fact that Hitler was 
never elected as dictator.  Although he was elected to the Reichstag, Hitler was 
appointed Chancellor by President Hindenburg.  Hitler soon passed the Enabling Act, 
which allowed him to write himself in as acting Dictator of Germany, essentially killing 
the Weimar Republic. 
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 It is also important to describe the social climate of Germany at the beginning of 
the twentieth century.  After a devastating defeat in World War I, Germany succumbed 
to a downward-spiral.  Not only did German society have to deal with the agony and 
humiliation of defeat, they also had to cope with the embarrassment of taking the blame 
for initiating the conflict.  Germany was also given the responsibility of paying 
reparations for the damages of the war all across the European continent which 
enhanced these hardships even more.  Everything combined, Germany’s core 
infrastructure was in tatters.  What may have been the most devastating part of the loss 
in the war was what the German people at home had to endure.  The majority of war 
propaganda in Germany from World War I that was shown to the German people at the 
home front made it seem like Germany was winning the war.  When the armistice was 
signed to end the war, the German people were surprised and angry to find that they 
were on the losing end.  The “Stab-in-the-Back Legend” became a popular myth after 
the war.  This concept stated that certain people—identified by the NSDAP as the Jews, 
Social Democrats, liberals, and the Communists—had betrayed the country and caused 
the defeat.  Myths such as this became widespread after the war, and when a series of 
inflation, rationalization, and depression hit Germany throughout the 1920s, they 
resulted in panic and hatred that could be used by certain people in order to manipulate 
and coerce society into subscribing to a certain belief or series of actions. 
 A second step to correcting the preconceived notions about the Nazi reign in 
Germany is reconsidering the role of right-wing intellectuals.  Examining several of 
these intellectuals is the aim of the following discussion.  Thoughts and theories of the 
conservative-revolutionary intellectuals will be discussed and analyzed in order to 
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demonstrate how the socio-economic and political conditions during Weimar made it 
possible for these three influential figures to spread their theories, and in certain cases, 
to promote their individual careers and aspirations.  The three men examined here 
represent three genres of writing: political, philosophical, and literary.  Though much of 
this examination will focus on the textual works, the actions of the intellectuals will also 
be discussed and examined.  The political sphere will be represented by Carl Schmitt; 
the philosophical sphere by Martin Heidegger, and the literary sphere by Ernst Jϋnger.  
With their writings and actions, these three intellectuals established themselves as 
leaders in their specific fields and may have even played a part in the growth of National 
Socialist sentiments in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
 This discussion will examine Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger in 
respect to how their writings and theories influenced and resonated with National 
Socialism during and after the Weimar period in Germany.  Although some instances, 
as in the case of Martin Heidegger’s theories, might seem directly linked to National 
Socialist ideals, they may need to be examined in greater depth in order to reveal the 
actual reasoning behind their writings and actions.  Whether directly or indirectly, these 
men indeed made a profound impact in regards to the negative emotions felt towards 
the Weimar Republic, and positive emotions felt towards a conservative revolution 
driven by a group such as the National Socialist German Workers’ Party. 
The basis for this discussion will be the primary works of the three men in 
question, as well as supplementary examination of secondary works composed by 
contemporary scholars.  Understanding the socio-economic climate provides a 
necessary historical context for understanding the theories of the three men.  In the first 
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short chapter, I will briefly discuss the time period after the armistice of World War I.  
The next three chapters will address Schmitt, Heidegger, and Jϋnger.  Each chapter will 
begin with a brief biographical sketch, followed by an analysis of their early writings and 
early career developments, their writings during the Weimar period—when each of 
these men expressed their most significant ideas and themes—and, finally, their 
writings during Nazi reign.  The conclusion will examine their writings as a whole, and 
compare them to the rest of their career in their respective fields.  The conclusion will 
also briefly assess of each individual’s impact on the growth of National Socialist 
sentiments in Germany, and how their career paths were related to the ideals 
expressed in their writings.  In short, this thesis will attempt to establish a coherent 
analysis of Schmitt, Heidegger, and Jϋnger individually, as well as of how their efforts 
combined in order to abet the popularity and/or legitimacy of the NSDAP.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WELCOME TO WEIMAR 
 
 A nation in extreme turmoil, the state of interwar Germany was one of instability.  
Coming off of a debilitating defeat in World War I, Germany was in dire need of a new 
beginning.  In combination with its defeat in the Great War, Germany was also put into 
further debt by the victors.  The Versailles Treaty that was ratified in June, 1919 placed 
a great deal of hardship on the nation of Germany.  Not only did it have to deal with the 
loss and blame for the war, it was also charged with paying reparations for the 
destruction throughout Western Europe.  Although it may be debated by historians such 
as Detlev Peukert whether or not the reparations were as big of a burden as many 
historians generally claim, dealing with the bills, along with all of the other charges from 
the defeat of World War I made Germany, at the very least, a nation heavily in debt .1 
 As some historians and authors have been quick to point out, the reparation bills 
that were imposed upon Germany were not the only cause of the turmoil to which the 
nation later succumbed.  The “War Guilt Clause” of the Treaty was also a major issue 
for German society.  Defeat in war was enough trauma for a nation to endure, but 
having to bear the blame for beginning the war even beginning was an additional 
hardship for many German people.  Additionally, due to the propaganda that was being 
used, the home front during the war, believed that Germany and its allies were 
decisively winning the war.   
                                                          
1
 Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, Translated by Richard 
Deveson, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992). 
    6 
In addition to the list of issues that the Versailles Treaty prescribed for Germany 
in terms of economic and social troubles, the political structure of the nation was in 
shambles.  Germany was in need of a new government.  The Empire had collapsed and 
the German people demanded that politics move in a new direction; the new direction 
being a Republic.  With the civil unrest that was rampant after the war, the Republic was 
to become a symbol of hope for a rebirth of the German nation.  In short, the Weimar 
Republic in Germany was an effort to stabilize and to bring stability  to a nation that was 
emerging from an emotionally devastating defeat in war.  In an era of rapid 
modernization, supporters of the Republic hoped it would be able to modernize the 
nation and bring it out of the depths of defeat.   
Many believe that the Weimar Republic in Germany was destined to fail due to 
the conditions that it had to endure in interwar Germany.  Though this is generally what 
is thought about Weimar Germany, a new concept is also being debated.  This is the 
concept that Weimar was not a complete and utter failure.  There are several historians 
who believe that the Weimar was in fact an era of great social progress.  Three 
historians of the Weimar era, Eric D. Weitz, Detlev Peukert, and Peter Gay, have 
discussed the progress that was made during the Weimar era of Germany.  They 
believe that Weimar possessed promising institutions that failed due to the combination 
of the Treaty of Versailles, the fragmented political parties of the time, and poor 
economic conditions.  Several areas of society were greatly improved during Weimar 
including, but not limited to, architecture, art, sound (phonograph and radio) and 
imaging technologies (photograph and fast-printing, printing presses), the performing 
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arts, philosophy and the liberalization of gender and sexual norms; on top of all that 
there was a solid economic recovery between 1924 and 1929. 
This thesis will examine how three intellectuals, directly or indirectly, provided 
ideological justification for the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich.  These writers 
helped set the stage for the Nazi Party to enter the framework of Weimar Germany, and 
to turn the country upside-down.  This thesis will examine three major intellectual areas 
of the German Nation in the 1920s and 1930s: the political, philosophical, and literary 
spheres. 
In terms of these three different intellectual spheres, Germany was in a unique 
position, because it had representatives who were leaders not only of their own nation, 
but also arguably of Europe as a whole in their respective areas.  Carl Schmitt will 
represent the political sphere in this thesis.  Although there are many issues that 
contemporary historians have debated regarding his theories, there can be no doubt 
that he was not one of, if not the most influential political theorist in Germany in the early 
part of the twentieth century.  In terms of political theorists, Schmitt was extremely 
flexible, which is one of the major reasons that contemporary historians and theorists 
find inconsistencies and even contradictions in his ideas throughout his career.  
Although there are historians that find his shifting political stances problematic, his 
different ideas are what make him so unique, dynamic, and extremely important when 
studying the Weimar period in Germany. 
With regard to the philosophical sphere, we will examine the works and career of 
the important twentieth-century German philosopher, Martin Heidegger.  There is much 
debate on the relationship of Heidegger to the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.  
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Most commentators have argued that Heidegger believed that only good would come 
from the Nazi reign in Germany and that, although he did not truly believe in everything 
that Hitler and the Nazi Party were doing, he did believe that what they were doing 
would ultimately lead to a desirable conclusion.  Though there is a debate concerning 
what his actual vision of the Nazi Party was, one theme is consistent through his career: 
opportunism. 
The literary sphere is represented by a soldier, writer, and a veteran of World 
War I: Ernst Jϋnger.  Bursting onto the scene writing about his experiences in the Great 
War, Jϋnger glorified the trials, tribulations and hardships of war and battle.  His many 
writings have caused quite a debate among contemporary historical and literary 
scholars because there are several different ways in which they can be interpreted.  
Although his texts glorify war and death, he never joined the inner circle of the Nazi 
Party—even though he was invited to do so.  These divergent interpretations are due to 
the fact the content of his writings was closely related to the views and theories of the 
National Socialists.   
The political, philosophical, and literary spheres of the Weimar Republic and the 
Third Reich played major roles in determining the fateful course of Germany in the early 
part of twentieth-century.  These three spheres were significantly shaped by the writings 
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Economics 
 
 One issue that proved to be extremely problematic throughout the Weimar 
Republic was the economic disasters that plagued the nation twice during Weimar’s 
existence.2  Although the Great Depression in particular occurred throughout much of 
the world, economic crises hit especially hard in Germany due to its loss of World War I.  
With all of the war debt that German leaders had incurred in order to finance the war, 
along with the reparations that Germany had to pay, the crises which hit after the war 
proved to be devastating in Germany.   
 The economic crises which Germany had to endure after the war are generally 
split into three separate and distinct phases.  As Eric D. Weitz explains, the phases 
were that of inflation, rationalization, and depression.3  Hyperinflation was due to the 
immense war debt that the German government incurred throughout the duration of the 
war, as well as the reparation payments that were inflicted upon Germany.  In order to 
compensate for the reparations that needed to be paid due to the loss in World War I, 
they raised prices to increase national profits.  Consumer prices went up, and many 
workers went on strike due to wage and hour issues.  With the workers going on strike, 
the nation had no choice but to acquiesce to the demands made by the workforce.  
Although the workforce technically ended the 1921 workers’ strike victoriously, not much 
effectively was changed.  The issues concerned with wages and hours were dealt with, 
but the economy was still suffering.  The workforce was getting higher wages, but the 
currency in which they were being paid was depreciating.  This monetary depreciation 
                                                          
2
 The first being hyper-inflation and the second being the Great Crash. 
3
 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
149. 
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was also due to French occupation of the Ruhr, which led the government to print an 
overabundance of currency.  Thus, inflation was followed by hyperinflation.  This 
hyperinflation caused the currency of Germany to become almost worthless.  
Stabilization projects were then put into effect.  The most significant of these 
stabilization projects was the one conjured up by Gustav Stresemann and Wilhelm 
Marx.  This project, in conjunction with the Dawes and Young Plans, not only created a 
more coherent payment plan for Germany’s reparations, but also vacated Allied forces 
from the Ruhr.  These stabilization projects eventually succeeded and assisted in 
reviving the German economy in 1924.  The successful conclusion of the stabilization 
projects ushered in the “Golden Years” of Weimar Germany in the mid-1920s.  These 
“Golden Years” were marked by immense changes in the social atmosphere in 
Germany.  During this period workers’ living standards began to steadily improve, and 
there was increased faith in the credit system. 
Rationalization was the next step for the nation.  Rationalization is the 
“application of scientific methods to production in order to expand output with less 
labor.”4  Germany began to look at the United States as the model of rationalization.  
German industrial leaders were in awe of America’s rate of production and consumption 
as well as their efficiency and effectiveness in production.  Germany began to use more 
modern methods and technologies in the workplace.  Although wages increased 
slightly, the major disadvantage of rationalization was the drastic increase in 
unemployment.  Both the industrial and agrarian workforce was adversely affected.  Life 
was turned upside-down for most Germans who became impoverished.  Even those 
                                                          
4
 Ibid. 
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that succeeded in these “Golden Years” were soon to be upended by the Stock-Market 
Crash in December of 1929. 
Although the stock market Crash began in the United States, it severely impacted 
Germany.  The Great Crash in the United States began a sort of domino effect that 
spanned across the world.  With the United States spinning into a financial crisis, one of 
their first maneuvers was to recall the short-term loans that had been given to Germany 
through the Dawes and Young Plans to help with reparations.  The loss of these short-
term loans sent Germany straight into a financial crisis that quickly developed into a 
crisis of production.  With the economic issues that Germany was facing at the time of 
the World Economic Crisis, it was forced to downsize its workforce and cut numerous 
jobs.  In 1930 almost one-third of the workforce was officially unemployed.  Weitz states 
that statisticians did not count another two million “unofficially” unemployed Germans 
which would account for 40 percent of the workforce.5  In turn, Germany also went into 
a period of deflation between the years of 1930 and 1933.  But this deflationary period 





The political conditions in Weimar Germany were extremely tense.  The Weimar 
Republic was initially proclaimed on November 9, 1918, and although there was some 
hope for it to succeed, it was almost immediately denied legitimacy by large sections of 
the German population.  Due to several differences in opinion, the constitution that was 
                                                          
5
 Ibid., 161. 
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drafted was quickly transformed into a list of compromises.  One article, in particular, of 
the Weimar constitution was to have fateful consequences for the Republic: Article 48.  
It stated: 
If a state does not fulfill the obligations laid upon it by the Reich constitution or 
Reich laws, the Reich President may use armed force to cause it to oblige.  In 
case public safety is seriously threatened or disturbed, the Reich President may 
take the measures necessary to reestablish law and order, if necessary using 
armed force. In the pursuit of this aim, he may suspend the civil rights described 
in articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153, partially or entirely.  The Reich 
President must inform the Reichstag immediately about all measures undertaken 
based on paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article. The measures must be suspended 
immediately if the Reichstag so demands.  If danger is imminent, the state 
government may, for their specific territory, implement steps as described in 
paragraph 2. These steps may be suspended if so demanded by the Reich 
President or the Reichstag.  Further details may be regulated by Reich 
legislation.6 
 
Although rule by emergency decree had been put in place by Heinrich Brϋning already 
in 1930, Article 48 would acquire additional significance in Hitler’s consolidation of 
power in 1933. 
Outside of the Weimar constitution, there was a thriving political world with many 
diverse active parties.  In the early 1920s no clear leader had emerged among the 
different political parties.  During this time Germany had a wider range of free speech 
than any other country; that is until a public speaking ban was put in place from 1924 
until 1927.7  The extreme right of the political world during Weimar idealized violence 
and racial anti-Semitism while the left idealized militarism due to the Bolshevik 
Revolution.  Representing the political left was the Communist Party (KPD).  
Representing the political right was the German National People’s Party (DNVP), the 
                                                          
6
 “Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919,” University of South Alabama, URL = 
<http://www.southalabama.edu/history/faculty/rogers/348/article48.html>. [accessed May 14, 2013]. 
7
 Weitz, 83. 
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German Peoples’ Party (DVP), and the National Socialist German Worker’s Party 
(NSDAP).  Representing the political center was the Weimar Coalition which consisted 
of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the German Democratic Party (DDP), and the 
Catholic Center Party.8  With so many different political groupings there was much 
political dissension during the Weimar Republic.  As a result German society was a 
disoriented and disillusioned community.9 
 Weimar, between the years of 1918 and 1924 and 1929 and 1933, were periods 
of duress and instability.  Economically, Germany was constantly in flux.  Once it was 
stabilized in 1924, it was quickly shattered again by the Great Crash in 1929.  Politically, 
Weimar saw more instability.  During the reign of the Weimar Republic, there was 
constant call for revisions or change, mostly due to the inability of the republic to 
stabilize the economy for a prolonged period of time.  This instability of the economic 
and political systems gave political and social organizations, such as the NSDAP, the 
opportunity to gain public support.  This thesis will examine how Carl Schmitt, Martin 
Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger may have further influenced the German people to fall in 
line with National Socialist ideology, and any motivations these men had in doing so. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 These are examples of the larger political parties that were represented.  Many smaller parties also 
existed during the Weimar Republic due to the “5% hurdle.” 
9
 Peukert, 245-246. 





 Carl Schmitt is essential to any examination of interwar German politics.  This 
section will chronologically outline his primary writings in a coherent and contextual 
manner.  Beginning with a brief biography, the discussion will then examine Schmitt’s 
writings from his early period, during Weimar, and under the Third Reich.  Though it can 
be argued that his writings lack a clear political ideal, this discussion will show how 
many of his fundamental principles remain firm throughout his interwar career.  
Focusing on writings through and after Weimar, this discussion will show how, although 
he argues that he supported the Weimar Republic, he consistently maintained political 
ideals that contradicted those realized with the Weimar Constitution.   
 
 
A Biographical Glimpse 
 
 Carl Schmitt, a German jurist, University Professor of Law, and legal theorist, 
was born in 1888 in Plettenberg, Germany.  Schmitt was a widely renowned political, 
legal, and constitutional theorist in Germany during Weimar Germany and National 
Socialist Germany in the early 20th century.  Still controversial today, many of his most 
influential writings were based on the principle that there is a decisive need for a strong 
central government in order to further the interests of the nation; that a republic which is 
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based upon liberal democracy and deliberation would never be able to express the 
unified will of the people.  Schmitt believed that a liberal democracy would ultimately 
harm the people, and the government, because nothing could ever be completed in a 
satisfactory manner.  He believed that no party in the deliberation process would be 
appeased if it needed to agree to some sort of compromise which would inhibit its 
desires and/or needs.  More importantly, he believed that all parties should be 
subordinated to the will of the state.   
 Carl Schmitt gained admittance to the Friedrich-Wilhelm University of Berlin,10 
which at the time was “the pinnacle of the university system and thus one of the 
greatest universities in the world.”11  Although he originally desired to pursue an 
education at the university level in the field of philology, he was quickly persuaded by 
one of his uncles to modify his studies “in the more practical direction of 
jurisprudence.”12  After passing the assessor’s examination and with the outbreak of 
World War I, Schmitt enrolled in the German Reserve Infantry.  After recovering from a 
back injury in basic training for the reserve infantry, he eventually rose through the 
ranks and was promoted to sergeant in the censorship sector of the regional martial law 
administration for the General Command of Army Corps 1 in Munich.13 
When World War I began, Schmitt began to develop some of his own personal 
intellectual ideals. Schmitt went against the popular mantra of nationalism during war.  
When the war began he “did not share the initial belligerent enthusiasm of his 
                                                          
10
 In 1949 Friedrich-Wilhelm University was renamed the Humboldt University 
11
 Gopal Balakrishnan, The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt (New York: Verso, 2000), 13. 
12
 Ibid., 13. 
13
 Ibid., 16. 
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countrymen.”14  The fact that many of his earliest works do not reference the idea of 
qualities and virtues specific to the German people is noteworthy because, as Gopal 
Balakrishnan notes, it shows just how detached Schmitt was from the German people 
as a whole, especially during what Balakrishnan designates, with just cause, as the 
“defining experience of his generation.”15 
 Although he illuminates the fact that Schmitt may have, early in his lengthy 
career, not always followed popular opinion, Balakrishnan does not fully develop this 
notion.  Schmitt was notorious for always adapting his theories to popular opinion.  
However, in the case of his early career, Schmitt maintains his personal ideals as 
opposed to the opinions of those who could advance his career further in a more 
expedient manner.  He embraces some opinions that would hold very little weight in 
terms of career advancement.  Although this independence did not last long in the 
future for Schmitt and his public opinions, it is a minor exception to a rule that many 
critics of Schmitt are quick to point out.   
 Much of Schmitt’s early professional years were spent focusing on his legal 
studies.  Although he did allocate some of his efforts to his personal legal and political 
theories, his most influential, and what would become his most controversial works, 
were composed after the conclusion of World War I during the Weimar Republic.  Many 
of his most renowned works revolve around ideals of sovereignty and centralized 
governmental power.   
 In 1933 Schmitt became a Professor of Law at the University of Berlin, a position 
he held until 1945.  Also in 1933, Hermann Goering appointed Schmitt the “Prussian 
                                                          
14
 Ibid., 16. 
15
 Ibid. 
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State Counselor.”  He was also elected president of the Union of National-Socialist 
Jurists in November of the same year.  It is easy to see the importance of Schmitt for 
the Nazis simply by looking at the numerous prominent positions that he held.  In 
addition to these positions, Schmitt was also a prominent advisor to several leading 
politicians. 
 There are two primary criticisms that are commonly leveled against Carl Schmitt.  
The first is the simple fact that he became a leading political theorist for the National 
Socialist regime when they ascended to power.  The motivation behind this criticism is 
the thought that it is difficult to put much importance on a political theorist who defended 
the indefensible.  The second and for our concerns here more pertinent criticism is the 
notion that Schmitt continuously adapted and manipulated his legal and political 
theories to adhere to the ideologies of those who were in power at the time; that he 
would change his own personal ideologies to suit those in power in order to advance his 
legal and political career. 
 A common criticism made in regard to the entire spectrum of Schmitt’s career is 
that he was not a true political theorist; that he simply adapted his theories in order to 
appease those who were in power at any given time.  Thus, Schmitt’s theories and 
works appear to fluctuate throughout his entire life.  Although this may have been true of 
the works during his “Nazi Experience,”16 as Joseph Bendersky refers to it as, some of 
his earlier works can be examined and interpreted in the opposite way.  For example, in 
1923 Schmitt composed an essay entitled The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 
                                                          
16
 Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1983). 
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which essentially condemned the political principles that had guided Germany in 
establishing the Weimar Constitution. 
 Although Carl Schmitt is commonly portrayed as a Nazi apologist who adapted 
his political theories as a reaction to events which were taking place in front of his eyes, 
there is much more to his writings.  Also, Schmitt is commonly criticized for the apparent 
discontinuity of his works.  Again, this statement might be true in some instances, but in 
other instances it can be regarded as shortsighted.  True, in the overall trajectory of his 
career there are many areas in which his theories are constantly fluctuating, but there 
are a small number of ideas which remain relatively constant in his works throughout his 
life.   
 In order to study the career of Carl Schmitt in a comprehensive manner, it is 
important to keep certain essential facts in mind.  Due to the extreme amount of 
fluctuation in his theories, the most important criterion to always retain is context.  The 
time and events which were occurring during the composition of his works are pertinent 
for the correct analysis of his works.  The second theme that must be addressed is the 
manner in which Schmitt’s writing should be approached.  As this study is more than a 
biographical sketch of Carl Schmitt, the examination would not be fulfilled with a general 
analysis of the texts.  Rather, in order to sufficiently detail his arguments, one must 
separate his works in a chronological fashion, again making sure to always retain and 
compare his views of a certain time period to the context of the socio-economic climate 
of that corresponding time period.  The three chronological phases most salient for this 
examination are: the period before and during World War I, the Weimar Republic, and 
finally the National Socialist Regime.   
    19 
Early Writings 
 
 Although the great majority of Carl Schmitt’s theories and works were composed 
after the First World War, there should be brief mention of his political theories before 
the war.  They may not have played a pivotal role in the grand scheme of his career, but 
Schmitt’s earliest intellectual works are still of interest as they provide the first indication 
of the ambiguous commitments which become much more apparent throughout the 
remainder of his career. 
 The majority of Schmitt’s earliest works were comprised of critiques of what was 
the dominant legal theory of the time: “legal positivism.”  The main premise of the theory 
of legal positivism is two-fold.  First, legal positivism states that laws are rules which are 
generated by human beings, and no other entity.  Secondly, this theory supposes that 
legal procedure has no direct or indirect connections with human ethics or human 
morality.  Legal positivism is a judicial theory which completely disregards any notion of 
“natural-rights.”  As Lars Vinx puts it, “the fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient, 
or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the fact 
that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for doubting 
it.”17   
 The very first of Schmitt’s writings before and during the First World War were 
scholarly in nature.  The first of his writings was his dissertation entitled Über Schuld 
und Schuldarten (“On Guilt and Degrees of Guilt”).  In this dissertation, Schmitt’s 
primary objective was to examine the specific moment in which a judge makes a 
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decision in a legal case.  He argues that this precise moment is extremely inefficient 
and is a “free-floating element in the legal process.”18  Schmitt soon complemented his 
dissertation with another discourse entitled Gesetz und Urteil (“Statute and Judgment”).  
This work too, which was an extension of his dissertation, focused on the precise 
moment when the judge makes his decision.  Schmitt concluded that the legal norm is 
extremely inefficient.  He argues that the legal norm is “entirely embedded in the 
ultimately arbitrary conventions of interpretation within the legal community.”19  Schmitt, 
in this text, appears to be entirely disgusted with the manner in which judicial decisions 
are made, and possibly even more so, how they are generally “proven.”  He indicates 
that “a judicial decision is now correct when it can be assumed that another judge would 
have come to the same judgment.”20  Schmitt emphasizes that legal positivism 
disregards any notion of natural law.  He states that, in practice, legal positivism does 
not presuppose any sort of inherent law of humanity; specifically, it does not reserve 
any possibility for morality or reason.  Schmitt, at this time, criticizes legal positivism 
believing that, if enforced correctly, it essentially eliminates reason, asserting that every 
person is accountable for their actions regardless of situation or alternate choices, 
whether it would have concluded more positively or negatively. 
 These two discourses which Schmitt composed before the First World War 
portray political views which are, as many historians are quick to indicate, very different 
from his post-war political theories.  Some of the basic principles he defends in these 
early writings are opposed to the arguments which he makes in the Weimar writings.  In 
these scholarly discussions Schmitt contends that interpretations in the legal community 
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are incorrect, vague, and inefficient.  He argues that the system in place needs to be 
recalibrated in order to become more effective.  Many of his writings during the Weimar 
period in Germany have a considerably different tenor to them.  Implied in these early 
writings, Schmitt appears to favor natural law, arguing that without accounting for 
morality, reasoning, and rationality.  Later writings, as will now be discussed, will imply a 





 Although many of his earliest works are fairly inconsequential in the grand 
scheme of his entire career the choices that Carl Schmitt made in his university years to 
pursue an education in jurisprudence followed him throughout his career.  As has been 
previously noted, Schmitt, during the outbreak of the First World War, did not display the 
same amount of enthusiastic nationalism as did most of his German counterparts.  With 
the arrival of the news of the armistice and the Treaty of Versailles, Schmitt then began 
to compose a series of some of the most significant political writings of the Weimar 
Republic. 
 In two of the first major works that Schmitt composed, he examines several 
issues such as sovereignty, the order of the state, and the question concerning 
leadership.  These works in question are The Dictator, written in 1921, and Political 
Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, written in 1922.21  The Dictator 
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was his examination of the historical meaning and use of dictatorship throughout the 
world.  Schmitt delves back to the original idea of dictatorship, that of Rome.  Dictatorial 
power in Rome was used for the protection of the current form of government.  The 
primary premise which Schmitt tends to emphasize throughout his work is that 
dictatorial power is not usually sovereign.  With the addition of the term “sovereign,” it is 
important to define what Schmitt truly identifies as “sovereign.”  He firmly believes that 
as long as governance is exercised with the will of the people in mind, a dictator would 
in fact be a sovereign dictator.  The entirety of Schmitt’s historiographical approach to 
the idiom “sovereign dictator” is intended to illustrate the development of basic 
emergency powers which the state should maintain in a suitable democracy.  This 
calling for a “sovereign dictator” is consistently hinted at in many of his earliest works, 
but The Dictator is where this ideal is fully developed.  This ideal becomes the keystone 
of Schmitt’s call for a populist dictatorship later in his career. 
 Many of the historical instances which Schmitt discusses involve revolutions.  
The primary reason that Schmitt discusses these revolutions is because emergency 
powers were called upon.  Most integral for him was the French Revolution.  The reason 
he places so much emphasis on the French Revolution is because Schmitt sees in it the 
first glimpse of a “sovereign dictatorship.”  What makes the French Revolution so 
important to his discourse is the fact that dictatorial powers were called upon and, most 
importantly, were used in order to transform the primary system of government in the 
name of, and by the will of, the people.  Schmitt noted the efforts of Jacobinism during 
the French Revolution.  The mentality of “fighting for the good of the general will” that 
was displayed, according to Schmitt would ideally translate to the populist movement 
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during Weimar, ideally leading to a populist and sovereign dictator.22  For Schmitt, The 
Dictator, although it stresses the impact of the French Revolution, presents a 
comparable situation to that of Weimar.  A sovereign dictator, in the name of the people, 
is the perfect solution for the instability of the Weimar Republic. 
 Another integral facet of Schmitt’s discourse on dictatorship is the fact that he 
views this “sovereign dictatorship” as being essentially a democratic institution since the 
dictatorial emergency powers are designed with only the true will of the people in mind.  
Schmitt argues that the term dictator should not be regarded as complete and 
permanent authority given to a single individual, and that any dictatorial emergency 
decree must only be made with the will of the people in mind. 
 In his 1921 work entitled The Concept of the Political, Schmitt analyzes the term 
politics, the political, and the state.  Schmitt begins this text by comparing the ideas of 
the state and of the political.  As he puts it, “the concept of the state presupposes the 
concept of the political.”23  What is crucial here for Schmitt is that the political is not 
equivalent to the concept of the state.  He then details the difference between the 
concept of the political and the concept of party politics.  The primary difference that he 
maintains is that the political is a component of human nature rather than a component 
of the state which is where he locates party politics.  Schmitt then devotes the 
remainder of the text to his primary thesis of the friend-enemy distinction as the basis of 
politics. 
 The friend-enemy thesis, on which Schmitt focuses the bulk of his attention in 
this text, states that, in the political realm, there must be a series of friends and enemies 
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in order for there to be a concept of the political.  He begins this argument by stating 
that “friend,” and more specifically, “enemy,” are, in essence, political terms.  An 
extremely important argument that Schmitt states here is that political enemies are not 
individuals, but rather belong to a group.  He expands his theory of the political enemy 
by stating that, “the enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict 
in general.  He is also not the private adversary whom one hates.  An enemy exists only 
when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar 
collectivity.”24  Schmitt also describes the enemy as necessary in order for the political 
and, to a larger extent, the state to become legitimate.  He continues the defense of his 
theory by stating that a political enemy of a state would not necessarily be the enemy of 
the state forever.   
The primary theme in this work, which could easily be seen as foreshadowing of 
Carl Schmitt’s future career development, is the differences between the friends of 
political groups and the enemies of political groups.  Schmitt makes certain not to 
delineate specific political groups, but he does outline proper actions to take in the case 
of political enmity.  Throughout much of his text he illuminates and suggests that war 
against political enemies is not only acceptable, but it is necessary in order to provide 
homogeneity in the nation or state.  In the mind of Schmitt, the state is the most 
important institution in the nation; the state is practically omnipotent in its reign, and is 
regulated solely by the people which put it in power.  Echoing sentiments Hobbes 
relayed in Leviathan,25 Schmitt even goes so far to declare that: 
The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power; the 
possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men…as 
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long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it 
in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy.26 
 
Although it is fairly easy to see the significance of this quote in light of Schmitt’s later 
personal involvement in the National Socialist state, it also illustrates his defense of 
state power more generally.  Throughout The Concept of the Political he attempts to 
justify any action the state could take; whether it is against other states, other political 
organizations, or against anyone, or anything, that could be considered a “real enemy” 
for any reason.  He states that “the justification of war does not reside in its being fought 
for ideals or norms of justice, but in its being fought against a real enemy.”27  Implicit in 
this quote is the complete rejection of not only international law, but also universalist 
norms including human rights. 
 Another major argument in The Concept of the Political is Schmitt’s ongoing 
polemic against the ideals and institutions of liberalism.  He declares that true liberalism 
attempts to begin the process of “depoliticalization.”28  He believes that true political 
belief systems lose the entire worth of their existence if the presence of a central state 
rests on the compromises of friendly deliberation and litigation.  If these attributes of 
liberalism actually guided any nation, it would, according to Schmitt, effectively lead to 
the lack of any political organization due to the absence of political differences which 
create the friend-enemy debate.  Thus, with no political differences, there would be no 
real politics and – recollecting his original statement in The Concept of the Political that 
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“the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political,”29– there would, in 
effect, be no state at all. 
Schmitt also stakes out a position concerning the possibility of universalism; he 
argues that true universalism is not actually attainable.  For evidence, he looks at the 
League of Nations which was created after World War I.  He states that the League of 
Nations would not be able to make collective political ideals due to the fact that, inside 
of the League of Nations, every state would still be recognized individually.  Schmitt is 
able to connect this argument to his friend-enemy thesis by discussing how, in such a 
group, there is still certain to be outcasts, and at the very least there will be dissent over 
ideas and topics.  He is able to connect his theories on universalism to his position on 
humanism as well.  He was also a critic of humanistic beliefs.  Humanity, in Schmitt’s 
views, cannot even wage war.  Humanity consists of all human beings.  In this sense, 
humanity has no one to wage war against; there is no other party for the collective 
humanity to declare war upon.  Schmitt believes that humanity corresponds to 
universalism in the very strong sense that it assumes equality for all.  He states that 
universalism of any sort would assume that there were no states.  Schmitt affirms this 
theory by stating, “universality at any price would necessarily have to mean the 
depoliticalization and with it, particularly, the nonexistence of states.”30 
Schmitt’s greatest fear is the lack or nonexistence of a political system, which 
would, in turn suggest the lack or nonexistence of the state.  In his discourse he states 
that liberalism and/or the Kantian idea of a global republican government would destroy 
both the political system and the state.  Schmitt declares: 
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It would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction of 
friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world or by voluntarily 
disarming itself.  The world will not thereby become depoliticalized, and it will not 
be transplanted into a condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics.  
If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of 
politics, then another people will appear which will assume these trials by 
protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule.31 
 
What Schmitt is stating is the fact that, if a certain group of people have no interest in 
the traumas of politics, and if they decide to take the liberal/universal route of 
renouncing their political ideals, there will certainly be a separate group that will be more 
than willing to take control of the area and instill their own personal political ideals.  This 
would effectively make the original group, which renounced their political participation, 
subject to the “protector…who decides who the enemy is.”32 
 In his 1922 discourse entitled Political Theology Schmitt further develops his 
theories regarding sovereignty and dictatorship.  In this text he argues that an individual 
authority must be present in order to dictate and guard legal norms of the state.  He 
argues that in a state in which there is a large legislative system, much of the legal 
precedents can be lost through the processes of translation and interpretation.  Schmitt 
declares that, in order for the legal system to hold true to its standards, a single 
authority must be present.  With an authority, the legal norms would be upheld with 
much more confidence and consistency.  He sees a basic problem with the way in 
which the legal system is upheld.  The system, as Schmitt understands it, is only as 
efficient as the case is clear.  In cases with specific and particular scenarios and 
evidence, he believes that there must be a sovereign authority who can properly 
interpret the legal code in terms of how it may pertain to the case at hand.  Schmitt here 
                                                          
31
 Ibid., 52. 
32
 Ibid. 
    28 
is only concerned with material law; he does not consider the role of emotion, morality, 
or mental state as he believes that politics and jurisprudence should not be concerned 
with matters of this nature. 
 Another concern of importance, according to Schmitt, is the fact that the legal 
system requires a “homogenous medium.”33  By this he is referring to the idea that 
normal legal codes prove to be ineffective in a political, economic, and social state of 
disarray.  He declares that no normal legal code can control a state in an emergency.  
He believes that the only person that can overcome a state in total emergency is “the 
sovereign.”34   
One of, if not the most important target of Schmitt’s criticisms was the institution 
of parliamentary democracy.  In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Carl Schmitt 
condemns the fundamental ideals upon which parliamentary democracy is based.  In 
order to truly understand the arguments made by Schmitt in this critique one must 
understand what in fact he is actually criticizing.  In the mind of Schmitt, democracy is 
understood as being a government which is ruled for and, more importantly, by the 
people.  With this idea at the forefront for Schmitt, one can examine his critique in 
further detail.   
 Democracy is a very fragile institution for Schmitt.  He believes that, in order for 
this institution to complete its duty in a way that satisfies its defining characteristics, it is 
necessary for the people to be in control of the government.  With the addition of the 
representative parliament, Schmitt believes that this condition will never be satisfied.  
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He believes rather that parliament destroys what it is designed to accomplish.  There 
are a variety of reasons for this belief which he elaborates in this critique.   
 The main reason he proclaims why the institution of parliament inhibits the ideals 
of democracy is the fact that there is a series of compromises throughout the 
deliberation processes that occur in parliament.  With compromises come the fact that 
people will not get exactly what they are aiming for; the people are being forced to 
concede a portion of their desires.  He declares early on in his treatise: 
Destroying almost every hope…parliamentarism has already produced a 
situation in which all public business has become an object of spoils and 
compromise for the parties and their followers, and politics, far from being the 
concern of an elite, has become the despised business of a rather dubious class 
of persons.35 
 
Although it is not realistic for every individual to achieve all of his or her desires, Schmitt 
believes that this is a failure of parliament to fulfill its duties.   
 Arguably one of the most disturbing arguments Schmitt makes in his critique is 
the idea of the majority and the “General Will.”  He states: 
In democracy the citizen even agrees to the law that is against his own will, for 
the law is the General Will and, in turn, the will of the free citizen.  Thus a citizen 
never really gives his consent to a specific content but rather in abstracto to the 
result that evolves out of the general will and he votes only so that the votes out 
of which one can know this general will can be calculated.  If the result deviates 
from the intention of those individuals voting, then the outvoted know that they 
have mistaken the content of the general will.36 
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Echoing the thoughts in Rousseau’s The Social Contract,37 Schmitt is effectively arguing 
in this instance that the essence of democracy states that only the people who vote on 
the victorious side of the issue are correct in terms of what the general will comprises.  
The people who voted for the opposition were mistaken when they were voting, and that 
the victorious option was what they truly desired: again reiterating Rousseau who 
argued that dissenters must be “forced to be free!”38  Schmitt is obviously criticizing the 
ideals of parliamentary democracy in this excerpt insofar as it entails the protection of 
minority opinions and rights.  
 Schmitt also states in his critique that the people are not necessarily being 
represented in parliament in a sufficient manner.  He accuses democratic 
representatives in parliament of having their own personal agendas which they pursue 
during deliberation instead of the desires of those who they are supposedly 
representing.  “Democracy seems fated then to destroy itself in the problem of the 
formation of a will.”39  He believes that in the true spirit of democracy, the 
representatives, have the problem of choosing whether to fight for the will of the majority 
or for the will of themselves.  In this case these parliamentary representatives have the 
ability to transform their own personal will into the general will of the people.   
 Schmitt states that “the minority might express the true will of the people; the 
people can be deceived, and one has long been familiar with the techniques of 
propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion.”40  This “ancient dialectic in the 
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theory of the will of the people”41 is another area in which Carl Schmitt believes 
parliamentary democracy is faulty.  This adage maintains the idea that just because 
there is a majority vote it does not necessarily correlate into it being the proper ideal for 
the general will.  Due to outstanding public and external factors, the will of the majority 
can be misrepresented and misconstrued.  The majority can be, in the words of Schmitt, 
“manipulated” and “deceived” by the hands of propaganda. 
 Throughout his entire discourse on the topic of parliamentary democracy, Schmitt 
argues that the principles, upon which this institution is based, are nothing but an 
“idealistic belief”42 that is no longer sufficient to complete the objectives it was 
constructed to accomplish.  His argument that parliamentary democracy is anachronistic 
is based on his thought that “today…the masses are won over through a propaganda 
apparatus whose maximum effect relies on an appeal to immediate interests and 
passions.”43  Schmitt argues that the parliament is outdated due to the fact that “political 
elite”44 no longer have the interests of the “general will” in mind, but rather their 
individual will. 
Although it may appear in this treatise that Schmitt does not believe in the values 
instilled in democracy, he is simply critiquing the institution of liberal parliamentarism.  
He aims to separate democracy from liberalism in order to create an authoritarian 
populist state.  By separating and defining liberalism and democracy, he is able to 
weaken the fundamental principles of both.  Concerning liberalism he declares that, 
being originally liberal in thought, parliament’s deficiencies are essentially unequivocal 
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because it has run its course.  Concerning democracy, Schmitt argues that it is 
incapable of being sustained due to, what he views as the essential issue within 
democracy, equality.  He maintains in this text that “every actual democracy rests on the 
principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally.  
Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and secondly—if the need arises—
elimination or eradication of heterogeneity:”45 a declaration that may foreshadow the 
direction which Schmitt’s career advances in the 1930s.46 
 In another major theoretical discourse, Constitutional Theory,47 Schmitt applies 
his primary political theories to the Weimar Republic.  In this discourse he argues that 
constitutional change is unacceptable due to the manner in which the Weimar 
Constitution was composed.  He argues that since the constitution was composed after 
the German Revolution of 1918 by a politically united people, the initial decrees that 
were included in the constitution are acceptable.  The problem that Schmitt perceives is 
the secondary decrees, or the decrees which the representatives incorporated into the 
constitution.  As it usually does, the role of the popular sovereign plays a major role, in 
Schmitt’s understanding, in the composition of a constitution.  He argues that, due to the 
fact that not all of the constitutional decrees were composed and agreed to by the 
popular sovereign, amending these different decrees must be done in various 
manners.48  Due to the fact that not all of the constitutional decrees were included in the 
same fashion by the same people, they are not inherently equal.  Thus, they must have 
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a varying ease of modification or amendment.  The conclusion which Schmitt attains 
returns to the sovereign dictator he had outlined earlier in The Dictator.  He argues that 
only a sovereign dictator possesses the ability to legitimately amend constitutional 
decrees in the name of the popular sovereign.  According to Schmitt, not only can a 
sovereign dictator challenge the current constitutional decrees, but also, if the popular 
sovereign fears a coup by a tyrannical representative group.  As a result, as Lars Vinx 
writes, “the German people, in a renewed exercise of their constituent power, might 
legitimately choose a non-liberal and non-parliamentarian form of democracy.”49 
 As critical as Schmitt is of liberalism, he actually defends it, in a sort of 
ambiguous manner, when he states that as long as the state is able to secure 
individuals’ constitutional freedoms in a proper fashion, liberalism would be acceptable 
for a short period of time.  Of course, the only acceptable means by which this security 
would be maintained would be the President of the Weimar Republic and the institution 
of the infamous Article 48 of the constitution.  Since liberal rights were fundamental to 
the Weimar Constitution, Schmitt believed that those rights would have to be respected 
and protected –though there was an important exception.  This exception was that of 
the sovereign.  He argued that, as long as it was done in the name of the people, a 
sovereign decision could suspend and amend any section of the constitution and 
political state that would be considered necessary.50 
 Although Carl Schmitt has been repeatedly accused of constantly changing his 
views, his writings during the Weimar Republic seem to consistently argue several 
similar points.  A sharp and consistent critique of liberalism can be found in the majority 
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of his texts during this time.  The overarching theme in a number of his texts is that 
liberalism is an attempt to universalize the state, to take popular sovereignty out of the 
political equation, and even to rid the state of politics all together.  In terms of his 
understanding of the role of liberalism, Schmitt believes that it essentially destroys the 
principles which it was instituted to defend.  Democracy, as Schmitt understands it, is a 
political institution which is designed to implement the will of the people.  Liberalism, as 
he repeatedly notes in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, effectively disregards 
the will of the people in favor of the will of those who were supposedly chosen to 
represent the will of those people and special interest groups.  Not only is there a 
likelihood that the representatives will choose for what is better for them than for the 
betterment of the people as a whole; liberal democracy also destroys the basic ideal of 
the people being sovereign.   
 As he makes clear in several of his writings during the Weimar period, Schmitt 
was also an advocate of a sovereign dictator.  In his discourse on the history and role of 
dictators, Schmitt was sure to define the specific sort of dictatorship which would be 
politically defensible for the state.  In Die Diktatur, Schmitt outlines a blueprint of what a 
proper dictator should be, and the correct situation in which a dictator would be useful, 
and even necessary.  He also continues to allude to the idea of a dictator, specifically a 
dictator that would declare an authoritarian populist state; in other works, such as 
Political Theology, he discusses the necessary role of a sovereign authority.51  He also 
states that a dictatorship is essential in his discussion of liberalism in The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy when he examines the issue of how disconnected the 
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institutions of liberalism are with the guiding ideals of democratic politics.  He states that 
a sovereign dictatorship is in much closer relation to democracy than that of liberalism.52 
 Another continuity which is apparent from a variety of Schmitt’s Weimar writings 
is the role of homogeneity.  Although it does not appear in as strong a manner as the 
other primary components of Schmitt’s arguments, the ideal of homogeneity is still 
present.  Although Schmitt argues in The Concept of the Political that there is a 
necessity for political differences, he describes how the end result should conclude with 
a sovereign authority who maintains the power to decide “upon the domestic enemy,”53 
and who is also capable in deciding in—“if the need arises—elimination or eradication of 
heterogeneity.”54 
 Easily the most formative period of Carl Schmitt’s career and theories, the 
Weimar period witnessed a plethora of new political ideas.  He was among the theorists 
who expounded on how a true democracy should be comprised.  Central to many of his 
arguments is his description of democracy.  Schmitt has a very specific definition of 
democracy, and what it entails.  In The Dictator he details what his definition is.  He 
believes that a democratic constitution is one voted by the popular majority.  The 
argument that he makes is that a democratic government must maintain an executive, 
“sovereign” body, capable of making decisions.  This, whether it is a president, or any 
other “head of state,” according to Schmitt, must also maintain the power to declare a 
“state of emergency,” or as Schmitt defines it, a “state of exception.”55  Schmitt identifies 
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this as being essentially dictatorial.56  This consistent support of “democracy” is a 
primary argument that he later points to in order to prove his support for Weimar and 





 Carl Schmitt’s career during the 1930s is the period that provides critics with the 
most ammunition.  This period of his career is by far the most controversial.  When 
Adolf Hitler ascended to power in 1933, Schmitt elected to amend his political 
allegiances in favor of National Socialism.  This decision has plagued the entirety of his 
career, for obvious reasons.  Schmitt became a leading political advisor to the Nazi 
party during the majority of their reign.  He was given a number of political promotions, 
and held high-ranking positions of political importance, such as when Herman Goering 
promoted him as Prussian State Counselor.  Not only was he a political advisor to the 
Nazi party, he was also a leading academic professor in the field of law and 
jurisprudence at the University of Berlin.  He was even elected as president of the Union 
of National-Socialist Jurists.  The year 1933 proved to be an extremely successful year 
for the personal career advancement of Carl Schmitt. 
 In order to coherently explore the career development of Schmitt after the 
National Socialist reign in Germany, it is important to examine the choices that Schmitt 
made, and the reasons for those choices.  Leading up to the Nazi rise to power, he 
suggested that he was an advocate of the Weimar Republic, though it was mostly due 
                                                          
56
 Ibid., 127-49. 
    37 
to the emergency powers that were entitled in the constitution.  In the latter writings he 
composed during the Weimar period, most notably his Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy, he strongly criticized the Weimar system.  The system, due to the drastic 
fluctuation of the economy—especially with the 1929 World Economic Crisis—was 
rapidly losing public support.  With this major point in the mind of Schmitt, many of his 
critics argued that shifting his support towards the Nazi regime was simply a ploy in 
order for the opportunistic Schmitt to further develop his career.  Although it is difficult to 
argue that these critics are incorrect, with all of the accolades he received shortly after 
amending his support, it can also be argued that this does not accurately represent the 
entire situation. 
 In many of his primary discourses throughout the Weimar period he presents a 
strong critique liberalism and the representational system of constitutional drafting; the 
essence of Weimar.  One of the only premises which Schmitt applauds from Weimar is 
that it was created by the people through the course of the 1918 revolution.  When 
comparing many of his political theories to National Socialism, there seems to be a 
greater amount of similarities.  Gopal Balikrishnan states of Schmitt during the early 
section of 1933 that: 
After a few months of caution in 1933, it dawned on him that National Socialism 
in power represented the unexpected, even perverse resolution of what he had 
earlier identified as the main problems of political order in age of mass politics.  
This conviction was the basis of his relationship to National Socialism, even 
when one allows for the role which naked ambition and opportunism played in his 
decision to cleave to the new order.57 
 
Another item that may have played into the decision which Schmitt ultimately made in 
shifting his political affinities to support National Socialism was self-preservation.  This is 
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another area which Balakrishnan describes.  Balakrishnan alludes to the idea that, in 
order for Schmitt to remain in German society, especially political society, he essentially 
had no decision to make.  Although this may be the case, it is also apparent that this 
was not the entire case either; no one with the mantra that they simply did not want to 
be outcast due to their political affinities would soon become referred to as the “’Crown 
Jurist’ of National Socialism.”58 
 During his affiliation with National Socialism Schmitt devoted the majority of his 
efforts to educating the youths at the University level, as well as defending the events 
which Hitler and the Nazi regime were propagating.  He occasionally published articles 
and texts which were designed to support the wrongdoings of the regime such as the 
Nazis’ killings of political opponents59 and their usurpation of power in order to create a 
more centralized government headed by Hitler.  These writings and texts are commonly 
used in the critiques of Schmitt for obvious reasons; he was effectively defending the 
indefensible.   
 Much of Schmitt’s time and efforts during his Nazi period were concerned with 
defending the acts of Hitler and Nazi leaders.  Many of these consist of the murders of 
Nazi political opponents.60  Schmitt was able to defend these killings by arguing that 
“the government can exempt itself from judicial review when it must ‘defend society 
against enemies, inside, outside, open, concealed, present, and future.’”61  This 
statement parallels his earlier notions made in The Dictator and The Crisis of 
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Parliamentary Democracy where he argued that emergency powers are necessary for a 
successful form of government. 
 National Socialism eventually became disillusioned with Schmitt and his politics.  
Balakrishnan credits this disillusionment to Schmitt’s political colleagues.62  Many of 
these former colleagues criticized Schmitt for his Catholic ideals, Jewish contacts, and 
fervent opportunism.  Nazi investigators began probing the devotion of Schmitt to 
Nazism, and Nazi leadership.  Goering soon called off the investigation citing his 
personal trust.  Goering stated, “Without wanting to take a position on the factual 
accusations which are in themselves not unjustified, I must emphatically state that it is 
not acceptable for well-known personalities, who have been called to high public office 
through my trust, to be defamed in this way.”63  During the latter years of Schmitt’s Nazi 
period, he dealt less with Nazi jurisprudence, and focused the majority of his time on 
questions involved with international law. 
 Although there are critics and sympathizers of Carl Schmitt due to his support of 
the Nazis after their takeover of Germany in 1933, no one argument is truly sound.  An 
examination of his Weimar work makes clear that it is highly unlikely that Schmitt made 
his decision solely in a fit of opportunism.  There is also the argument, although not as 
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Looking Back 
 
 Carl Schmitt is a highly controversial political figure.  The reason behind this is 
primarily due to the decision he made in the early 1930s to support the National 
Socialists.  Many historians are quick to criticize the decision he made based on the 
argument that he compromised his principal political theories in order to advance his 
political and professional career. 
 Throughout his works, there is a plethora of evidence that supports the argument 
that Schmitt did not have to critically amend many of the primary principles of his 
theories.  When examining his discourses, especially those from the Weimar years, it is 
exceedingly difficult to determine whether Schmitt is criticizing the Weimar Constitution 
or supporting it.  Although he “openly” declares that he was an advocate of the Weimar 
system in his latter works, it is difficult, especially in his early works to discern whether 
he supports the political system.   
 The principles guiding the Weimar system were a representative democracy 
based on liberal principles.  These are the basic principles of what Weimar was 
instituted to represent, on behalf of the people.  These principles are essentially the 
same that Schmitt condemned in the vast majority of his Weimar discourses.  Some of 
his criticisms are more candid than others, but the majority of his discussions 
concerning liberalism and representative democracy culminate in a strong criticism of 
the doctrines as a whole.   
 Several of his texts focus on these Weimar principles.  In The Dictator, The 
Concept of the Political, and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy he states what he 
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believes are the primary problems with the doctrines in the Weimar Constitution; 
specifically with the ideals of liberalism and of representative democracy.  In The 
Dictator, Schmitt applies the foundations for many of his works that were soon to follow.  
He declares how there is a great necessity for a strong central government; more 
specifically a dictator, and a dictator who is placed into power on behalf of the people to 
be exact.  This supposed necessity of a strong central government was not represented 
anywhere in the Weimar Constitution. 
In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt continues his assault upon 
what could be seen as the institution of the Weimar Constitution.  In this text Schmitt 
sets out in hopes of undermining the basic principles instituted in liberal democracy as a 
governmental establishment.  He declares that a government founded with these values 
will not be sufficient in providing for the safety and welfare of the people it governs over.  
The majority of this text emphasizes the objections Schmitt has to basic principles of 
liberal democracy and, specifically, of parliament.  Schmitt views parliament as an 
unproductive tool which is not effective in making adequate and efficient decisions 
based on the general will of “the people.”  In attacking the parliament, Schmitt is 
effectively attacking one of the main institutions used in the drafting of the Weimar 
Constitution.  While the constitution was being drafted, the parliament was in control of 
deliberating different options and ideals that could be incorporated into the constitution.  
If Schmitt’s theories are taken directly as he composed them in The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy, it can easily be deduced that the manner in which the 
Weimar Constitution was constructed was simply inappropriate.   
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 Schmitt’s assault on the institution of parliament is also analogous to the Nazi 
reign in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.  The very idea of parliamentary discussion 
during the reign of Hitler was suppressed.  He had only a small number of close 
advisors who would counsel him in major decisions.  This, in combination with the 
“sovereign dictator” idiom which Schmitt writes about, is a clear parallel to the reign of 
Hitler and the National Socialists.   
 When looking at the theories that Schmitt composed during Weimar Germany, 
one could find it difficult to relate them to the ideals instilled in the conception and the 
implementation of the Weimar Constitution.  The Weimar Constitution was based upon 
the liberal ideal there the people were represented by many different parties in a 
parliamentary style republic.  These very ideals were opposed vehemently by Schmitt in 
the majority of his texts during the Weimar Republic.  Very little, if any, liberal thought or 
liberal sympathies can be found when analyzing his writings.  In fact, the majority of his 
writings are in strict opposition to liberal thought.  Schmitt argues that there should be a 
dictator that exercises power, in the name of the people, and that the dictator should 
rule in a very strong manner.   
 After considering everything, it is very easy to see the many parallels between 
the theories of Carl Schmitt and the ideals of National Socialism.  The gray area 
between his theories and the ideals instilled by the Weimar Constitution become more 
distinctive.  Schmitt’s alleged support for the Weimar Constitution is greatly 
exaggerated.  Although many scholars believe and declare that Schmitt greatly skewed 
his Weimar theories to adapt them to the ideals of the National Socialists, upon further 
review it appears that his views could have been adapted to the ideals of the National 
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Socialists rather easily.  When taking the Weimar Constitution, and comparing it side-
by-side to National Socialism and Hitler’s reign in the 1930s and 1940s, Schmitt’s 
theories are much closer in relation to the latter.  The basic premises involved in 
National Socialism are shared by the theories composed by Schmitt during Weimar.  
Both idealize a strong centralized government that is realized by way of a populist 
“sovereign dictator.” 
  





A Biographical Glimpse 
 
 Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in Meβkirch, Germany.  He began his 
extensive studies in the realm of theology but eventually altered his studies to the field 
of mathematics and philosophy.  After earning his doctoral degree and completing his 
dissertation, “The Doctrine of Categories and Signification in Duns Scotus,” Heidegger 
enrolled in the German Army and achieved rather quick success, being promoted from 
private to the rank of corporal within ten months.64  Although he had some early success 
during his stint in the armed forces, Heidegger was discharged from the German Army 
due to health concerns.65  He then began to focus on a new profession: teaching and 
lecturing at the university level.  His first major professorial position was at the 
University of Freiburg where he became a lecturer of philosophy.  Later, Heidegger took 
a position of associate professor at the University of Marburg in 1924.66  These were the 
years when he wrote Being and Time, 67 the philosophical work that would prove to be 
the most influential, as well as most controversial, of his career, even though he was 
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pressured to finish before it was truly completed.  Heidegger claimed that the work 
represented only one-third of the final masterpiece he was ultimately planning.68 
 Heidegger would continue to hold his position of professor and also continue 
delivering his lectures at the University of Marburg until 1928 when he elected to accept 
a professorial position at the University of Freiburg.  The year 1933 posed a very 
important professional achievement as well as a very big political decision for 
Heidegger.  In 1933 he was elected Rector of the University of Freiburg.  This was also 
the year when he officially joined the National Socialist Party.  These two milestones for 
Heidegger are most certainly related to one another.  He held his position at the 
University of Freiburg until 1934,69 when he resigned because of disputes with several 
faculty members and local Nazi political officials.70  Although he resigned as Rector due 
to the differences in opinion with Nazi administrators, Heidegger remained a member of 
the National Socialist Party until 1945.71 
 Due to his influence and importance as a philosopher and his involvement in the 
Nazi Party, Heidegger is a highly controversial figure.  To make matters worse in terms 
of controversy, he refused to apologize for his involvement even after receiving such 
advice from Herbert Marcuse.72  During the denazification process, Heidegger was 
banned from lecturing at the university level, essentially ending his professorial career.  
He was also denied emeritus status for a period of time, although he was ultimately 
awarded the status.  Heidegger suffered a nervous breakdown in 1946, but continued to 
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compose speeches and write.  Although he continued to write and speak, his most 
important, influential, and controversial pieces remain those he wrote from the late 
1920s and early 1930s, especially his magnum opus Being and Time.  Martin 
Heidegger died in Freiburg on May 26, 1976. 
 The life and career of Martin Heidegger is still an area of much controversy 
today.  Some of the more important scholarly texts composed by Victor Farias, Richard 
Wolin, and Emmanuel Faye are highly critical of Heidegger, his career, his political path, 
and his philosophy.  These three men have similar arguments.  They essentially argue 
that Heidegger believed that his most important ideals had been realized with the 
takeover of the National Socialist Party.  Although these authors adopted varying 
degrees of severity in terms of how they judged his career path, all three of them 
conclude that Heidegger’s theories bore a strong correlation to the ideology of the Nazi 
Party. 
 The philosophical theories most pertinent to the examination at hand are found in 
Being and Time.  As Richard Wolin suggests,73 the principal philosophical ideas in 
Being and Time can also be used to examine Heidegger’s political values.  In this 
chapter I will take a similar approach, although the argument that is made is slightly 
different.  While Wolin, Faye, Johannes Fritsche and other scholars tend to argue that 
Heidegger’s philosophies were realized with National Socialism, it will be argued in this 
thesis that it was rather the opportunistic Heidegger that was able to adapt and 
manipulate some of his ideologies in order to advance his career and personal agenda 
within the growing Nazi Organization.  Once in a position of power, Heidegger believed 
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that he would be able to influence Nazi administrators into taking stances that were 
more in line with his true philosophical ideals.74  The predominant ideas in the texts of 




Being, Time, and Politics 
 
 The life of Martin Heidegger has been subjected to much scrutiny and criticism.  
This is due in part to his influence as a philosopher, and to the decisions he made to 
join and his involvement with the National Socialist German Worker’s Party.  A highly 
influential philosopher and professor at both the University of Freiburg and the 
University of Marburg, his career was marred by this decision.  Many scholars such as 
Richard Wolin, Johannes Fritsche, Michael Zimmerman, and Emmanuel Faye, assert 
that many of Heidegger’s political ideals can be derived from his philosophical texts.  
The most notable of these is Being and Time. 
 Being and Time was Heidegger’s most influential philosophical treatise.  In this 
text he aims to effectively examine what “Being” truly is.  There are three main theories 
that are integral for the understanding of this text.  The primary theme and purpose of 
the text is to pose the question of the meaning of Being.  He desires to examine what 
the essence of “Being” is.  He is also determined to describe the criteria for what type of 
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entity constitutes a “being.”75  The first major theme of “being” is the conception of 
“being.”  Heidegger argues that in order to fully grasp the meaning of “being” one needs 
to conceptualize the fact that he is himself truly “being.”  A true “being” needs to 
therefore become fully aware of their own existence.  The “being” that is able to 
conceive himself as existing as a “being” is what Heidegger denotes as “Dasein.” 
 Dasein is the second notion that must be grasped for Heidegger.  Dasein is his 
attempt to state what is encompassed in “being.”  He states that Dasein is not “man” but 
at the same time is nothing other than “man.”  According to Heidegger Dasein is the 
human being that is aware of itself and its existence.  This is also where he begins to 
examine the concept of authenticity.  According to Heidegger, authenticity was 
essential.  Several attributes were also necessary for authenticity to be achieved for 
Heidegger.  Not only does there have to be a sense of individualism, but also—as is 
seen in the final two sections of Being and Time—a subordination of this group of 
individuals to the collective.  For Heidegger, this would ultimately result in 
Schicksal(s)gemeinschaft, or the “community of destiny.”  This community that 
Heidegger anticipates is a community that is united in will and ideals.  The notion of 
authenticity for Heidegger leads to the third notion, that of time. 
 Time creates a problem for Heidegger in his theories.  According to him, Dasein 
is a being that is self-aware of its personal existence.  Along with this concept comes 
the idea that this Dasein is a human being.  Human beings have a finite life span; that is 
to say that Dasein will be born and will eventually die.  Dasein to Heidegger does 
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neither.  According to him, Dasein is much more than just a human being, it is the 
ontological category of historicity that is grounded in the individual. 
 Although on the surface this text does not show much similarity to National 
Socialist theories, when one examines the text more carefully, there are certain parallels 
between the two.  As Richard Wolin states near the beginning of his critique and 
examination, Heidegger never specifically states his political theories.   But, Wolin 
states: 
In Heidegger’s case, the element of mediation is provided by his “political 
philosophy’; or, more adequately expressed—since, for reasons that will later 
become clear, Heidegger never articulated a political philosophy per se—by the 
“political thought” through which Heidegger seeks to philosophically ground his 
understanding of the world political situation.76 
 
Wolin is stating that although Heidegger never articulates his political beliefs, they can 
be inferred from his philosophical theories.  Although Wolin is not the only scholar to 
believe this to be true, this is the primary basis for his arguments throughout the text.  
Wolin details the philosophy that is in Heidegger’s Being and Time, and demonstrates 
through a thorough examination that the ideals instilled, specifically in the last two 
sections of the text, are essentially the same as the tendencies realized in National 
Socialism.  Emmanuel Faye is another scholar that argues this point of view, though 
through a certainly more aggressive critique. 
 Emmanuel Faye argues that Heidegger’s philosophical ideals, which are 
embodied in Being and Time, have strong political parallels with National Socialism.  
Though the basis of his argument is very similar to Wolin’s, Faye takes a much stronger 
stance in criticizing Heidegger and his philosophy.  Faye expands on the argument 
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made by Wolin by drawing upon new lecture notes that were not available to Wolin in 
his work.  Between Wolin and Faye, Wolin’s work is a more credible piece of 
scholarship.  Although Faye’s work offers some insight, there are inaccuracies, 
specifically in many of the translations.  Faye is also blinded by his argument at times 
which can explicitly be seen in his various arguments concerning Heidegger’s alleged 
anti-Semitism. 
 These two scholars make numerous arguments that are very critical, but useful, 
to the examination at hand.  Along with other scholarly works these offer a tremendous 
amount of insight into the philosophical and political theories of Martin Heidegger.  
There are many incidents that anticipated the decision Heidegger would make in 1933; 
there are several instances when National Socialist ideals can be discerned in his texts, 
most notably Being and Time. 
Though Wolin and Faye both attack the philosophies and career of Heidegger, 
there are those that are more sympathetic to him.  Hans Sluga is notable in this 
category.  In his text Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, he 
outlines Heidegger’s career, and argues that he was guilty of failed political ambitions.  
Sluga attempts to persuade the reader that Heidegger strongly believed that he could 
successfully steer the Nazi State in a better direction.  This naive belief was fatal to the 
political and professional career of Heidegger.77 
 In an examination of Being and Time, it is essential to separate three main 
tendencies.  The first division of the text is Heidegger’s argument for radical 
individualization.  In this argument, Heidegger discusses the way in which people need 
                                                          
77
 Hans Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, (Cambridge, MA., Harvard 
University Press, 1993) 296.  
    51 
to be cleansed from the evils of modern technology and society.  Through this cleansing 
process, Heidegger argues that the people should be re-educated in the importance of 
philosophy and tradition.  The second tendency is the process of recovering one’s 
individual self and authenticity.  Heidegger states that this tendency can only be 
accomplished by acknowledging and facing one’s mortality.  The third tendency in Being 
and Time, which is most pertinent to this examination, represents a significant change.  
The final two sections of the text are where Heidegger argues for a “community of 
destiny,” or the Schicksalsgemeinschaft.  This concept refers to a community of people 
that have already gone through the cleansing process proposed in the first section of 
the text, who thus have a uniform set of values and knowledge.  Thus, this group of 
people would maintain the same wants and desires.  Heidegger then argues that this 
“community of destiny” must select a “hero” or strong leader that would guide them in 
the best possible direction.78 
 Throughout the first sections of Being and Time Heidegger devotes his attention 
to the individual.  Instead of describing a specific person he refers to Dasein.  He 
refrains from specifying a gender of the Dasein.  He does not use the terms “he” or 
“she.”  In the final sections of Being and Time specifically, Heidegger seems to do 
everything within his power to make Dasein capable of representing a singular, multiple, 
or collectivity of all society.  What he is doing is essentially stripping society of any 
individuality.  By combining every person, a class order or struggle no longer exists.  It 
is effectively arguing for a sort of National Socialist ideal where there is a loss of 
individuality; where every person joins together in a collective effort regardless of 
individual gain.  This can be seen in Section 74 of Being and Time.  It is in this section 
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that Dasein recognizes its fate and becomes part of the collective.  Dasein can choose 
to recognize its fate, obey the call, and submit to its fate.79  According to Heidegger, 
Dasein could become autonomous by not missing the opportunity to become “master of 
their fate.”80  For Heidegger, fate was a calling for Dasein to join the community of the 
people.   
 In his discussions pertaining to his theory of societal “being,” Heidegger also 
makes reference to another National Socialist doctrine; the Volksgemeinschaft.  Closely 
related to his discussions of the “self” and the “I” involved with society Heidegger argues 
in his text that once the self is realized, there is a collective Gemeinschaft of the people.  
As Emmanuel Faye argues in his text, “the real project of Being and Time is the will to 
destroy the idea of the I in order to make room for the ‘most radical individuation’ 
(radikalsten Individuation), which is emphatically realized not in the individual but in the 
organic indivisibility of the Gemeinschaft of the people.”81   
 This is another example of Faye being essentially blinded by his argument.  
Though he argues his point very firmly, he overlooks one of the basic roots of 
Heidegger’s personal ideals; his disdain towards the concepts of science.  Heidegger 
was a strong opponent of modern technology and science.  The concept of biological 
categories, including the concept of race, would thus be inconsequential for Heidegger.  
Faye, although he mentions Heidegger’s critical stance concerning science, 
demonstrates a lack of continuity in this argument.  All of his “evidence” is very vague 






 Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, Translated by Michael B. 
Smith. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2009) 17. 
    53 
and as so, could easily be interpreted in a way that is completely removed from any 
type of race theory.  
 In the final sections of Being and Time, Dasein to Martin Heidegger is the 
realization and collectivity of the people as a group.  The group is not any collection of 
any sort of people.  He believes that the collectivity of people in this group must have 
certain prerequisites.  These prerequisites require the members of the collection to 
realize their common ties; they must know that the group is more important than the 
individual.  The group must also realize what their goals are, and what events need to 
happen in order to make them a reality.  In addition, the group must also select a “hero” 
or leader that will be able to follow.  This “hero” would be a strong personality who 
maintains a goal of uniformity and subordination to the collective. 
 As Faye also argues in his text, Heidegger was an avid supporter of taking steps 
towards creating a homogenous state.82  As Faye mentioned, in Being and Time 
Heidegger was a firm believer that there was a culture of “inauthentic” people.  Faye 
asserts that in some of Heidegger’s later texts, he focuses on the idea of the 
Gleichartigkeit,83 or the “extermination of the heterogeneous.”84  In addition, he also 
refers to the Gleichschaltung,85 or the means of achieving the Gleichartigkeit.86  Faye 
asserts, “not only that the Gleichschaltung is a political ‘bringing into line’ but that its 
goal is racial ‘reconstruction’ or ‘homogeneity,’ by the exclusion of ‘non-Aryan elements 
of a foreign race’ from ‘public life.’”87  What Faye finds evident is the fact that Heidegger 
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called for an “extermination of the enemy” (which Faye identifies as the Jew without 
much evidence from Heidegger) which the collective group of authentic people 
identified. 
Here again, Faye makes an error which comes with the translation and 
tendentious interpretation that he uses for Gleichartigkeit.  A more proper translation of 
Gleichartigkeit would be “uniformity.”  This change in translation quickly exposes the 
inaccuracies of another of Faye’s arguments in which he puts a large amount of stock.  
To make matters worse, the difference in translations makes it appear to the reader that 
Faye is modifying what Heidegger wrote to appease his argument, regardless if it is 
accurate or not. 
Although there are many inaccuracies and faults found in Faye’s text, it is an 
important piece of literature to review in a discussion concerning the role of Heidegger 
and his philosophies, and the possible impact that they may have had on the growing 
conservative revolutionary sentiments during Weimar Germany.  Though some of his 
arguments may have flaws, the point of view and interpretation Faye maintains for 
Heidegger and Being and Time is important for any objective examination.  
With a discussion and an investigation of Heidegger’s Being and Time, it is 
imperative to at least mention the concept of decisionism.  Heidegger’s decisionism is a 
major point of emphasis for the arguments that Richard Wolin makes in his text.  The 
main aim of the text is to deduce the political thought and opinions of Martin Heidegger 
solely based on Heidegger’s own writings; specifically Being and Time.  This major 
argument that Wolin makes deals with the governmental system that he supposes 
Heidegger promotes in Being and Time.  Wolin contends that Heidegger strongly 
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promotes an authoritarian governmental system in Being and Time.  He argues this due 
to the fact that in Being and Time Heidegger is a strong proponent of decisionism.  In 
his work, Heidegger argues that it is much more important for the “hero” of the 
community to assertively make a decision rather than to rationally justify his decision.  
He continues his argument stating that a singular opinion in a decision making process 
is stronger and more effective than a decision made by way of a sort of parliamentary, 
liberal, deliberation.  Wolin states that what Heidegger truly yearned for was “politics 
grounded in a pure decision”88 and “not based on reason and discussion and not 
justifying itself.”89  Heidegger appears to view decisions being made in a dictatorial 
fashion as optimal decisions as they are the only “pure decisions” because they have 
not been altered or amended by deliberative action. 
As is documented by Karl Löwith,90 Heidegger based his support of National 
Socialism on the idea of historicity.  Richard Wolin asserts that it was not solely the 
premise of historicity on which Heidegger based his support of National Socialism; 
decisionism also played a major role in his support.  Wolin States: 
Freed of such bourgeois qualms, the National Socialist movement presented 
itself as a plausible material “filling” for the empty vessel of authentic decision 
and its categorical demand for existentiell-historical content.  The summons 
toward an “authentic historical destiny” enunciated in Being and Time was thus 
provided with an ominously appropriate response by Germany’s National 
Revolution.  The latter, in effect, was viewed by Heidegger as the ontic fulfillment 
of the categorical demands of “historicity”: it was Heidegger’s own choice of a 
“hero,” a “destiny,” and a “community.”91 
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Wolin’s thesis is based upon the theory that Nazism filled a void that existed in the 
middle of Heidegger’s philosophy and was not seen as incompatible by Heidegger with 
his philosophy.  Whereas Faye attempts to argue that Heidegger was a major 
proponent of the Nazi Regime, Wolin takes a much more realistic and convincing 
approach.   
 The argument that Wolin begins to make, that Heidegger was using National 
Socialism to fill this void he had in his philosophy in a most extreme case of 
opportunism, is the argument being made in this thesis.  Whereas Faye argues that 
National Socialism was realized within the contents of Being and Time, it can be argued 
that there were enough similarities in the text that Martin Heidegger was able to mold 
his writings and philosophies into the ideals that were instilled in National Socialism.  
Thus, Heidegger would be able to proclaim himself the true “philosopher king” of 
National Socialism and, as Hans Sluga argued, could in turn use his power and 
influence to guide Nazi leaders in the “correct” direction.  This opportunism, as will be 
discussed, blurred the vision of Heidegger’s beliefs and in some of the choices he made 
through important times of his career. 
Published in 1927, Being and Time is the major work of Martin Heidegger during 
Weimar.  Although it is clear that Being and Time is crucial for examining the 
importance and influence of Martin Heidegger during and after World War I and the 
Weimar Republic, it is not the only work that needs to be explored.  What may be just as 
important in this examination are the actual decisions that he made and events that took 
place through this period of time. 
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Beyond Being and Time 
 
Although Being and Time is arguably the most important and influential work by 
Martin Heidegger, the arguments in that work are far from being the only ones relevant 
to Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism.  Many of the thoughts that scholars 
such as Richard Wolin and Emmanuel Faye are able to distill out of Being and Time 
concerning Martin Heidegger’s political ideals are fairly well documented, but there is 
much more to the National Socialist tendencies of Martin Heidegger.  Throughout many 
of his writings, correspondence, lectures, and speeches, there are many similarities 
between Heidegger’s personal theories, and the theories propagated and promoted by 
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party.   
Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers’ Party sought a break from 
liberalism and Western Civilization.  The product of the modern bourgeoisie, liberalism 
posed such an immense threat to the ideals of the National Socialist Party because the 
primary theories that National Socialism sought to promote were “Aryan” racial 
supremacy.  Liberal thought maintained the ideals of discussion and deliberation with 
the opinions of all coming into account when a decision was made.  Although Hitler and 
his propagandists might have deceived the people of Germany into believing that the 
National Socialist Party had the best intentions, the only opinion that truly mattered to 
the National Socialist Party was those of Adolf Hitler and some of his closest advisors. 
To the National Socialists, liberal thought was something that was not part of 
their master plans.  With such events as the Beer Hall Putsch, it was apparent that 
central power was much more pertinent for their success.  As both Wolin and Faye point 
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out, Heidegger was also extremely fond of the works and theories of Ernst Jϋnger, who, 
as this work will elaborate upon, was a major advocate of struggle, power, and, most of 
all, war.  As understood by Adolf Hitler’s text Mein Kampf, a major premise of his 
personal ideals, and National Socialism as a whole, was strife and struggle for power.   
A similar promise that Heidegger saw in struggle was another type of decision.  
He believed that if a person or group of people were to decide to engage in some type 
of war or conflict, the decision must be very resolute and concrete due to the fact that 
there is no ability to rescind their actions.  This type of decision was something that 
Heidegger idealized due to the fact that it was made without any sort of remorse or 
caution; it is based simply upon instincts and core beliefs of a strong leader.  As Richard 
Wolin cites from Heidegger’s Rektoratsrede, Heidegger states, “all powers of the heart 
and all capacities of the body must be deployed through struggle [Kampf], intensified in 
struggle [Kampf], and preserved as struggle [Kampf].”92 
Wolin, Faye, and others argue that Heidegger’s philosophy was realized with 
National Socialism.  Although this is a popular argument made by critics of Heidegger, 
this is conceptually incorrect.  One could argue that Heidegger’s philosophy was not 
realized, but rather adapted by Heidegger in order to relate more succinctly to the 
ideologies of National Socialism.  In a fit of opportunism, Heidegger was hoping to claim 
a position of power and importance in order to influence politics and policies which the 
Nazi administration was making.  As Michael Gillespie states: 
[H]e was convinced that the possibility for such a revolution [(of subordinating 
technology to knowledge)] existed within this movement and within this 
movement alone.  What was necessary to bring this revolution about was a 
commitment by the positive intellectual forces in Germany to join this movement 
                                                          
92
 Ibid., 29. 
    59 
and spiritualize it from within.  He saw himself playing a leading role in this 
effort.93 
 
Heidegger did become disillusioned with the Nazi organization fairly soon after he 
realized that Nazi leaders had no interest in any of his personal ideas. 
Heidegger was also opposed to the modernization of Germany.  According to 
him, modernization; specifically modern technology, and modern science, would 
ultimately lead to a decreasing intellectual capacity of the people.  As Michael 
Zimmerman points out, Heidegger believed that modern technology would make people 
lethargic, senseless, and incompetent.94  Heidegger maintained that language and 
tradition that preserved a non-instrumental relationship to nature and “being” could 
prove to be a strong determining factor in the success of a person or a state.  He not 
only preached this core ideology, he lived it, calling the Black Forest area of Germany 
his home for many years; fundamentally cutting himself off from the “tortures” of modern 
technological society.95 
  As Jeffery Herf elaborates, the Nazi Party, while claiming to reject modern, 
urban, industrialized Germany, in fact flourished with the use of pro-modern and pro-
technological tactics.96  The anti-modern sentiments maintained by Heidegger ultimately 
put him at odds with the practices of the Nazi Party.  Although Heidegger maintains 
such revulsion for technology and modernity, he also maintained that the use of modern 
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technology would justify the results that he believed National Socialism would 
accomplish, especially with himself as leading philosophical advisor to Nazi 
administration.  As Michael Allen Gillespie argues in his article “Martin Heidegger’s 
Aristotelian National Socialism”: 
Heidegger developed a vision of praxis and politics on an Aristotelian foundation 
that he believed would reverse the domination of theory and technology in 
modern life and put it its place the rule of practical wisdom or phronêsis that was 
rooted in a historical understanding of the world and that put human beings and 
human action ahead of values, ideological imperatives, and the process of 
production.97 
 
A primary argument that Gillespie makes in his article is that Heidegger first became 
attracted to the National Socialist movement due to the fact that he believed that it 
offered a much needed solution to the “crisis of Western Civilization.”98  Although 
Heidegger eventually became disillusioned with the prospect of the Nazi movement 
creating a break with Western Civilization, he believed, as Gillespie concludes, that “the 
Nazi movement was bringing such a politics into being and that even when he 
recognized this was not that case, he continued to believe such a politics was both 
necessary and desirable, modifying only his conception of the means by which such an 
end could be attained.”99 
Heidegger and Carl Schmitt have ideals and theories that are extremely similar in 
various ways.  Although many of his arguments concerning Martin Heidegger are based 
upon Heidegger’s Being and Time, Emmanuel Faye also widened his sources.  Faye 
also researched Heidegger’s speeches, lectures, letters and lesser known publications 
and works that were never fully published or published at all.  The majority of these 
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speeches and publications, such as Heidegger’s Rector’s Address, entitled “The Self-
Assertion of the German University,”100 suggest a similar point: that Martin Heidegger 
was a very enthusiastic advocate of the National Socialist Party, and of the actions that 
the party was undertaking.  In his Rector’s Address, Heidegger lays out his arguments 
and plans to renovate the structure of the German University system to go along with 
the systematic changes occurring within the German state.  Although this is a common 
perspective on the subject, Emmanuel Faye argued the point more strongly than his 
counterparts.   
Faye is so adamant in his attacks on Heidegger that he even argues that 
Heidegger should not even be considered a true philosopher due to the fact that he was 
attempting to proselytize his fellow Germans into following the National Socialist Party 
by justifying the theories and acts that the party was taking in the 1920s and 1930s.  
Although he is very radical and unsympathetic in his position concerning Heidegger, 
Faye’s work does shed some light on Heidegger before his official conversion to 
National Socialism.  In order to do this, Faye dissected statements made by some of 
Heidegger’s closest students and followers from earlier periods.  For example, Faye 
notes that former students such as Gϋnther Anders and Max Mϋller note the emotions 
and beliefs of Heidegger were those very similar to National Socialist tendencies far 
ahead of the massive growth of the party in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Mϋller 
even states that Heidegger would talk to his students about the ““relationship of the folk 
[Volkstum] with nature, but also with the Youth Movement [Jugendbewegung].  He felt 
an intimate closeness to the word volkisch and said he was tied ‘to the blood and the 
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soil.””101  Faye also notes how another “disciple”102 of Heidegger, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, recalls Heidegger having an “’obvious sympathy’ […] ‘for the Nazi 
radicalism…far earlier than 1933.’”103 
The ideas of the Volk and the importance of “blood and soil” are significant facets 
of National Socialism.  These two terms were critical to the successes of National 
Socialist propaganda during the growth and expansion of National Socialism in 
Germany.  What Emmanuel Faye is essentially attempting to argue in this section of his 
text is that it was abundantly apparent to his students that in retrospect, Heidegger 
always had National Socialist tendencies, and, at least to a certain degree, argued and 
attempted to instill those theories and beliefs to his students in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. 
This is an area where Faye is tendentious, and where he loses much of his 
credibility.  In these transcripts that Faye selects, he fails to mention some of his more 
notable students, such as Herbert Marcuse.  Marcuse is just one of Heidegger’s former 
students that have stated the complete opposite of the students that Faye includes in 
his critique.  Marcuse claimed that he saw no trace or foreshadowing Heidegger’s 
National Socialist tendencies were apparent before 1933.104 
In addition to all of these notations and accounts taken from former students, 
Faye also delved into the diary of Hermann Mörchen.  Mörchen, a German philosopher, 
studied under Heidegger from 1925-1929 and kept in contact with him after his studies 
concluded.  Mörchen’s diary stated that Heidegger firmly believed that National 
                                                          
101






 Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, eds. Richard Wolin and John Abromeit (Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2005) 169.  
    63 
Socialism was a necessary step in the evolution of the German people.  Mörchen stated 
that Heidegger held this belief due to the fact that he maintained that National Socialism 
was the only political ideology that could successfully be in opposition to Marxism.  This 
notion that he held onto, Mörchen stated, was because of the head of state in a National 
Socialist regime: a dictator.105   
One important notion that Faye examines in his text are the actions that 
Heidegger took physically.  Faye did not simply discuss Heidegger’s “philosophical” 
importance in his writings and speeches; he also examines the events that took place 
throughout his tenure as university rector during the National Socialist reign.  One of the 
most important of these physical actions taken by Heidegger is that of the discussion 
concerning “Gleichschaltung” or the “bringing into line” of the German people.106  
Heidegger was a major player in the ideals instilled in the thought and belief of 
Gleichschaltung.  Heidegger played an important role for the Nazis in this regard.  The 
role Heidegger played was to provide a certain amount of legitimacy to the Nazi regime.  
With Heidegger, whom was already one of the most prominent European philosophers 
of the time, joining the National Socialist Party, it would surely draw some popular 
interest due to his social, academic, and intellectual status. 
Another instance where Faye loses some of his credibility is when he compares 
Heidegger’s ideals to National Socialist conceptions of race.  Faye puts a significant 
amount of weight on his argument that anti-Semitism played a major role in Heidegger’s 
political and personal ideology.  He even devotes four of his nine primary sections to the 
notion of race.  Faye, by way of incorrect translations and distortions of Hediegger’s 
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texts, argues that Heidegger maintained racial and, more specifically, anti-Semitic 
prejudices throughout his career. 
For Heidegger, race proves to be insignificant in his texts.  Even in his magnum 
opus Being and Time, he does not mention the notion of race being any sort of deciding 
or divisional factor in authenticity.  Also, his disgust with modern science is at odds with 
Faye’s claims about alleged racial/biological based arguments.  These arguments are 
also at least rendered questionable by Heidegger’s many relationships with Jewish 
students such as Herbert Marcuse, his teacher and dedicatee of Being and Time 
Edmund Husserl, and his intimate relationship with Hannah Arendt.  With all of these 
factors, Faye’s arguments that are based on race are negligible at best.   
A major step for his career advancement occurred when the Heidegger was 
elected, by his colleagues, Rector of the University of Freiburg in April, 1933.  His 
colleagues believed that he would protect the university from the National Socialists.  
These same colleagues were surely surprised when the opportunistic Heidegger, in his 
Rektoratsrede, came out openly in strong favor of the Nazi Regime.107 
 Martin Heidegger played a major role in this initial goal of the Nazi 
Gleichschaltung.  By attaining the position of rector of the University of Freiburg, 
Heidegger was effectively the head of university.  He was able to approve or deny any 
piece of legislation.  Ironically, Heidegger officially joined the NSDAP just eleven days 
after he was voted to the position by a faculty senate.  Also ironic, this faculty senate 
had just undergone an alteration to its members.  Less than a month before the vote for 
the rectorship of the University of Freiburg the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des 
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Berufsbeamtentums went into effect.  This “law for the reconstitution of the civil service,” 
as it is translated to, effectively revoked the employment of “non-Aryan” university 
professors.  Although this legislation, upon Hindenburg’s insistence, offered exceptions 
to Jewish veterans who fought in the First World War, in the Badenland, which included 
the University of Freiburg, another legislation was passed; the Badner Decree which 
allowed absolutely no exceptions.   
 Although it could be argued that Heidegger had no reservations about taking the 
rector position due to the fact that it was a great opportunity to further his career at the 
university level and that all he needed to do was to follow the ways of the National 
Socialists, upon further investigation, it was most likely not as simple of a decision for 
Heidegger.  His close friend, former teacher, and dedicatee of Being and Time, Edmund 
Husserl, was a professor at the University of Freiburg, and was in fact Jewish.108  This 
means that not only was Husserl stripped of his emeritus status at Freiburg, but he was 
also stripped of his livelihood.  Also, Faye points out that Heidegger and his wife even 
composed a note to the Husserl family and stated that the legislation and decisions 
made were “hard” but “reasonable.”109  Faye states that the letter showed just of how 
strongly Heidegger felt about the Gleichschaltung, and the need for a shift in the 
German university and his faith in National Socialist decrees.  He stated not too long 
after that he was acting “in full awareness of the necessity for the unconditional 
implementation of the law on reconstructing the Civil Service.”110  Faye is swift to state 
the obvious similarity between this statement by Heidegger and general National 
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Socialist rhetoric; the insistent adjectives such as “full” and “unconditional.”111  Here 
again, Faye fails to correctly translate the passage, and instead takes the liberty of 
adding key words to the translation.  A correct translation shows that Heidegger and his 
wife must “act as if we unconditionally commit” to the German decrees.  The addition of 
the word “act” critically changes the interpretation of the passage which Faye cites.  
Although many of the public speeches he gave during the time period, such as his 
speech “The University in the New Reich”112 given to the Student Association at the 
University of Heidelberg, in which he essentially subordinates the university system to 
the state, suggests that he was enthusiastically supportive of the Nazis, the new 
interpretation shows a sense of remorse and regret due to the events resulting in the 
decree, as opposed to the unconditional devotion that Faye argues Heidegger 
maintained.  What seems most likely, according to the sources available, is that 
Heidegger was so entrenched in his own personal philosophical growth and ambitions, 
that he was willing to make certain sacrifices. 
 Another essential facet that goes along with the Gleichschaltung was the 
“Fϋhrerprinzip.”113  This concept created a sort of dictatorship within the university level 
that appeared to be in correlation to the dictatorship of Hitler and the Nazi Party.  
Although the “rector-Fϋhrer” was elected by the faculty senate, he was in control of 
selecting, by way of his personal free will, all of the other power positions involved in the 
university.  The “rector-Fϋhrer” had the ability to handpick the dean of the university.114  




 Martin Heidegger, “The University in the New Reich”, speech given on June 30, 1933. English 
translation in Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998, pp. 44-45 
113
 Wolin, The Politics of Being, 124. 
114
 Martin Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität / Das Rektorat, 1933/34: 
Tatsachen und Gedanken. Frankfurt: V. Klostermann, 1983. 
    67 
With this, just as when Hitler took power over the state, eliminated all sense of 
democracy at the university level.  Heidegger drastically curtailed the powers of the 
faculty senate and attempted to establish a direct link with the students, who were 
sympathetic to the Nazis, in an effective manner.  He attempted to put a boot camp 
system in effect that would essentially prepare a line of philosophy-rulers for the 
future.115  This is a goal that is suggested not only in Being and Time, but it is also 
briefly suggested in his Rector’s Address.  He states: 
They will no longer permit Knowledge Service (Wissensdienst) to be the dull and 
quick training for a “distinguished” profession.  Because the statesman and the 
teacher, the doctor, and the judge, the minister, and the architect, lead the being 
(Dasein) of people and state, because they watch over it and keep it honed in its 
fundamental relations to the world-shaping powers of human being, these 
professions and the training of them have been entrusted to the Knowledge 
Service.116 
 
This “Knowledge Service,” which was the third part of Heidegger’s tripartite service 
system that he outlines in his Rector’s Address, is an argument that the state of the 
university system needs to be reconstructed around the education of future leaders of 
Germany. 
 Heidegger was ushered into the role of Rektor-Fϋhrer due to the ministry and the 
changing climate of the state for several reasons.  Nazi leaders most likely had their aim 
set on a multitude of tasks and positioned Heidegger to fulfill certain tasks according to 
the Fϋhrerprinzip and the Gleichschaltung that the state had its eyes set upon.  
Heidegger was a trophy for National Socialism.  Being one of the leading philosophers 
of the time, he brought a certain amount of intellectualism and legitimacy to the Nazi 
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Party.  For Heidegger, it seems as though he was more sympathetic to opportunity than 
to Nazi ideologies.  Many ideologies that were found within National Socialism were 
ideologies that Heidegger held firmly in contempt.  Modernization, technological 
advance, and biological racism are ideals that are not defended by Heidegger.  Thus, 
what was the true connection between him and National Socialism if he had no interest, 
and even held many of National Socialist ideals in contempt?  Even with all of this as 
evidence of the differences between his core beliefs and the root ideologies of National 
Socialism, he opportunistically became a member of the Nazis, thus propelling his 
career forward.  Although he believed for a few years that National Socialism was 
heading in the right direction, the manner in which they were achieving it seems less 





 Whether one is reflecting on Being and Time or the events of his life in the first 
decades of the 20th century, it is clear that Martin Heidegger was a man of great 
influence, and still to this day, is a man of great controversy.  Being and Time alone is a 
philosophical masterpiece that is without doubt one of the most influential works of the 
20th century, but the influence of Heidegger goes well beyond just this single text.  He 
exercised a lifetime of influence, the most important of which came during the late 
1920s and through the early 1940s while he focused his time at the university level. 
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 Throughout the entirety of Being and Time, specifically the last third, there is 
authoritarian political rhetoric which was compatible with Nazi ideology.  In this text, 
Heidegger is calling for a renewed and united nation; a nation of “Being.”  He is urging 
the German nation to rid itself of all “inauthentic” people from taking part in the state.  
Heidegger believed, very similarly to Hitler, that these people were a disease to the 
German social climate, and that the only way for the German nation to become powerful 
again was to reconstruct a homogenous nation and civil service.  Although there seems 
to be an apparent parallel to Hitler’s “final solution,” Heidegger’s goal was different.  
While Hitler aimed to eliminate the Jews, Heidegger instead aimed to re-educate the 
inauthentic peoplewith his own ideas and to make himself the Philosopher King of 
National Socialism. 
This idea for a philosophical dictatorship to be put in place in Germany is argued 
for especially in the final sections the text; that a dictator would be the only true way for 
the German nation to return to power.  Being and Time emphasizes the fact that the 
nation of “beings” needs a strong and centralized leader in order to keep the people on 
course.  This dictator is also called for by Heidegger “to make possible the moulding of 
individuality in seeing and looking, [which] would be a pedagogical task for the stae.”117  
This would ensure a nation of blind followers, although this was surely not the way in 
which Heidegger would describe them.  Heidegger would surely describe them as a 
group of powerful and enlightened “beings” that have a uniform set of goals.  For 
Heidegger, “authenticity” is only possible within the “national Schicksalsgemeinschaft.”  
However it is described, it effectively creates a homogenous group of people that would 
decisionistically “choose it leader” and uncritically conform to a single person of power.   
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 As a professor at the university level for the majority of his professional career, 
Martin Heidegger was in the ideal situation to proselytize and propagate these thoughts 
and theories to youthful and impressionable minds.  Being put on a stage in front of 
adolescents that are eager to learn, especially in a field with such ambiguity as 
philosophy, gave Heidegger a perfect platform to disseminate his own personal theories 
and ideologies.  During this time period, Heidegger was ideologically involved with his 
theories of “being.”  Although at the time these theories may not have been thought of 
as politically important, after World War I these theories, as have been previously 
discussed, had a clear and distinct political tenor.  When the war came to an end, many 
of the ideals discussed in Being and Time have been seen to coincide with many of the 
ideologies of Hitler and the National Socialist German Worker’s Party. 
Being named Rector of a university system is of key importance for the goals of 
the Nazi party to be realized.  Together with programs and organizations such as The 
Hitler Youth, having control over the information that would be taught, in a legitimate 
setting, would potentially form the minds of the youthful minds of Germany.  Not only 
were these minds of the youth of Germany, but they were also the adolescents that 
would eventually become the educated elite of Germany.  In turn Heidegger was 
personally in charge of hiring and firing the instructors and determining what the 
curriculum would be for the future teachers, businessmen, lawyers, and other 
professions that had the greatest potential to hold positions of power.  The Nazis and 
Heidegger had similar aims in the re-education of the German people, but the final 
goals were very different.  The primary goal for the Nazis behind these steps was to 
effectively create several generations of Nazi followers who would all collectively follow, 
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out of their own free will and thought processes, the ideals set out by a strong central 
leader, such as Hitler.  Oddly enough, the culminating objective is remarkably 
comparable to the one set out by Heidegger in Being and Time, although it soon 
became apparent to Heidegger that his vision of the future and a “totally transformed 
German Dasein,” was very different than Hitler’s.  Heidegger opportunistically believed 
that being elected Rector would lead to his re-education of the “inauthentic” people, 
educating them in the official philosophy of Nazi Germany; the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger himself.  This opportunism was obstructed when Heidegger soon realized 
that the Nazis had no interest in his ideals, and were just using his name to bolster their 
intellectual legitimacy.   
Conservative revolutionary thought is another ideal that is abundant throughout 
Heidegger’s philosophies and career.  Heidegger consistently points to the tragedies of 
modern society and technology.  He believed that the modern world is “the ever more 
encompassing attempt to objectify nature, to convert it into an object that can be 
mastered and controlled.”118  The primary component of the modern world that 
Heidegger attacks is natural scientific thought and the institution of modern technology.  
Heidegger believes that technology puts a premium on the process of production, and 
even promotes production over human beings and human values.119  According to 
Michael Gillespie, “Heidegger was attracted to Nazism because he believed it offered a 
solution to the crisis of Western civilization.”120  Gillespie’s interpretation effectively 
debunks many of the anti-Semitic based theories that Faye defends. 
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Martin Heidegger’s career and philosophies are controversial to this day.  
Although it is commonly argued by scholars such as Wolin, Faye, and Fritsche that 
although his authoritarian political attitudes began to form well before National Socialism 
began, it can be argued instead that Heidegger was able to opportunistically adapt his 
philosophical ideals to fit that of National Socialism in order to advance his personal 
career and political agenda.  Although there are also those who maintain that there was 
a shift between Heidegger’s pre-Nazi and Nazi ideologies and that there are no political 
theories that can or should be inferred from his texts—specifically Being and Time—the 
two periods of his life and work are so important to both philosophy and German 
interwar history, that they should be examined, and examined together.  It is nearly 
impossible to ignore Heidegger’s opportunism that is vivid while examining his career, 
Being and Time, and the events and goals of the Nazi period in Germany during the 
early twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Ernst Jϋnger  
 
A Biographical Glimpse 
 
Born in Heidelberg, Germany in 1895, Ernst Jϋnger was the oldest of six 
children.  Jϋnger’s father played a major role in his development during childhood but 
unfortunately his father’s role was pertinent in an adverse manner due to a lack of 
emotional affection.  His father, a professional chemist and pharmacist, is commonly 
depicted in Jϋnger’s memoirs as being extremely distant emotionally from Jϋnger, or 
from any of his siblings for that matter.121  His mother, on the other hand, was quite the 
opposite.  She was overwhelmingly warm, loving, and affectionate.  Although she was 
very caring and tender towards her children, she was commonly “overpowered by the 
domineering personality and charisma of the patriarch.”122 
Though his father was very unaffectionate, he was highly interested in the 
intellectual development of his children, especially Ernst.  During the majority of his 
youth, the Jϋnger family was constantly on the move. He was constantly being uprooted 
and transplanted to different educational institutions.  Different schools meant an 
assortment of varying conditions to which Ernst needed to constantly adjust himself: 
different settings, people, friends, teachers, rules.  Taking this into account, it is no 
wonder that Ernst was very dispassionate about and disconnected from his education.  
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In addition, Jϋnger believed that the educational system had too many rules and 
regulations.  Rules and regulations, such as the ones enforced in school, were against 
the innate complexion of Jϋnger’s mind.  He was a daydreamer; the physical walls of a 
classroom could not contain his mind or imagination.  As Elliot Neaman puts it, “he 
belonged to the generation of youth in Germany that rebelled against the philistinism 
and suffocating Bϋrgerlichkeit of Wilhelmine Germany.”123 
While the classroom could not hold Jϋnger’s attention very effectively, he 
believed that he was destined to find something that could.  “The tendency of flight into 
a dreamworld sustained him well into adulthood,”124 and in 1911 he joined the 
Wandervogel, a part of the German youth movement.  The Wandervogel taught 
“defiance, hate, yearning, love,” and everything that had been “repressed, denied [and] 
forcibly sublimated”125 during his youth due to his authoritarian father.   
 In 1913 Jϋnger left home in search of more adventure and excitement.  He 
decided to join the French Foreign Legion in Algeria.  Here he made an unfortunate 
discovery; the dreams he had of the adventures awaiting him were crushed.  Not only 
were his youthful exotic fantasies of Africa crushed, but Jϋnger was also captured by a 
group of mercenaries.126  Although it may seem improbable due to their past tensions, 
Ernst’s father came to his rescue, liberating him from mercenary captivity. 
 After returning home in 1914, Jϋnger reached a pact with his father.  The pact 
consisted of a single agreement; if Ernst completed high school, his father would fully 
fund a trip for the two of them to go on a mountain climbing expedition to Mount 
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Kilimanjaro, a trip which would surely fulfill Ernst’s adventurous fantasies.  The Great 
War broke out soon thereafter.  Jϋnger presumed this was his chance at real adventure 
and jumped at the opportunity to take a high school proficiency examination.  Jϋnger 
passed the exam and subsequently enlisted in the German military, specifically the 
Fusilier Regiment 73.  After two months of basic military training Jϋnger was sent to the 
front lines.  The trenches are where Jϋnger’s fantasies of excitement and adventure 
were finally realized.  Carrying a notebook documenting his experiences he noted that, 
“the things waiting for us would never happen again, and I anticipated them with the 
greatest curiosity.”127 
 The war was exactly what the young Jϋnger yearned for.  He was quickly 
awarded for his extreme bravery during the war as he was shot and wounded a number 
of times, including being shot in the lung, and was wounded a total of fourteen times 
throughout the war.128  He was also awarded the Pour le Mérite, the highest order of the 
German army, by the Kaiser personally.129  Jϋnger was the youngest to ever receive 
such an honor.  After the war ended, Jϋnger was one of the 100,000 men that were 
allowed to remain in the restricted army permitted per terms of the Treaty of Versailles 
and was put in charge of reconstructing the training manual “designed to introduce 
future soldiers to the technology and tactics” of possible warfare in the future.130 
 The notes that Jϋnger compiled throughout the entire war served as the 
groundwork for one of his most significant works, Im Stahlgewittern (Storm of Steel).  
Although it was just his first piece of literary work, it was arguably his most popular.  
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Storm of Steel is also credited with asserting many of Jϋnger’s values, philosophical 
ideals, and political viewpoints.  The manner in which Jϋnger dealt with the horrors of 
war is precisely the reason, not only why he was so popular, but also why he was such 
a controversial figure.   
 Ernst Jϋnger might be the most controversial of the three intellectuals examined 
in this study.  Although he is noted as being a leading Nazi literary figure, Jϋnger was 
never an official member of the National Socialist Party—a fact to which he later would 
repeatedly point when defending the events of his life, particularly during Nazi control of 
Germany between 1933 and 1945.  Jϋnger was commonly attacked due to the fact that 
his texts glorified many of the same ideals that are commonly associated with the 
National Socialists; war, work, and nationalism. 
 The relationship between Ernst Jϋnger and National Socialism is wrought with 
tension.  Though some of the basic principles found in his earliest works appear to 
parallel many of the focal points of the NSDAP, this is a misconception.  As we will see, 
Jϋnger was envisioning a governmental system that would not be satisfied through the 
Weimar Republic or National Socialism.  Many of his critics, such as Elliot Neaman, Kurt 
Sontheimer, and Nikolaus Wachsmann, have argued that Jϋnger was a proponent of 
the NSDAP.  These historians arguments parallel each other in many respects pointing 
to the fact that Junger published articles in the NS – Briefe (National Socialist - Letters), 
glorified work as did the National Socialists, and aestheticized war.  In reality, though 
Jϋnger indeed published a small number of articles in the NS – Briefe, he in fact 
published articles in numerous publications and articles of various political affiliations.  
He published articles in the Völkischer Beobachter (Nationalist Observer), Das 
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Tagebuch (The Diary), a Liberal publication, the Deutsches Volkstum (German Folk), 
and was an editor for Der Vormarsch (The Advance).  In these various periodicals and 
publications, not only is there evidence that supports the arguments made by Neaman 
and Wachsmann and that shows Jϋnger’s support of National Socialism, but there is 
also evidence of his resistance of National Socialism.  In 1929 Jϋnger published an 
article entitled “‘Nationalismus’ und Nationalsozialismus” in Das Tagebuch.  In this 
article Jϋnger attacks the “nationalist” movement, especially the NSDAP.131  For Jϋnger, 
this article, along with his publication of On the Marble Cliffs are two primary instances 
where a split is definitely evident between his ideals and those of National Socialism.   
 The affinity Jϋnger had for Nazi ideals was due to his experiences in World War 
I.  As a youth Jϋnger was always searching for adventure.  At the age of nineteen, 
Jϋnger found the adventure he was searching for; he entered the German armed 
forces.  He was sent to the front lines after a very brief and basic training.  When he 
finally arrived at the front lines, he came to the realization of what the Great War was, 
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compilation of Jϋnger’s wartime diary entries and notations, collected and composed in 
a single, coherent text.  Jϋnger received immediate acclaim for this text due to the 
exuberance and honesty with which he expressed himself, especially the unflinching 
detail of his own personal experiences in World War I.  In the end, Jϋnger did much 
more than simply compose a text compiling his wartime memoirs; he essentially 
became a polarizing figure throughout the Weimar years in Germany.   
 World War I had an obvious impact on the young Ernst Jϋnger.  Storm of Steel 
begins with the young and naïve Jϋnger getting his feet wet when he saw his first 
“action” in Orainville.  A rather sobering moment for Jϋnger, he found out that war, 
especially in the Great War, was not at all what he had expected.  Instead of the 
excitement of dodging bullets and hand to hand combat, he found himself in a different 
scenario.  “Instead of the dangers we had hoped for, only mud and work and sleepless 
nights had fallen to our lot, and the conquest of these called for a heroism that was little 
to our taste.”133  Although this was not exactly what Jϋnger had hoped for, his fortune 
was soon to change, although again, not necessarily to what he had expected. 
 Before Jϋnger had gained any combat experience, he was brought face to face 
with a horrifying reality of war.  He described a morning when he awoke to a corpse in 
utter surprise and horror.134  He stated that the French must have gone months without 
burying their fallen soldiers.  After this first glimpse of death due to war, Jϋnger seemed 
as though he had a legitimate feeling of horror, but soon after he stated, “Although I 
made up my mind to omit all comments from this book, I should like all the same to say 
a word or two about this first glimpse of horrors.  It is a moment so important in the 
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experience of war.  The horrible was undoubtedly a part of that irresistible attraction that 
drew us into the war.”135  Although he first described the horrors of war with surprise, he 
soon described how it became rather mundane.  He gave a colorful description of the 
change in perceptions of human loss in the war: 
We looked at all these dead with dislocated limbs, distorted faces, and the 
hideous colours of decay, as though we walked in a dream through a garden full 
of strange plants, and we could not realize at first what we had all around us.  But 
finally we were so accustomed to the horrible that if we came on a dead body 
anywhere on a fire-step or in a ditch we give it no more than a passing thought 
and recognized it as we would a stone or a tree…136 
 
This description essentially showed the growth, or rather the transformation of a 
youthful, adventure seeking Ernst Jϋnger, into Ernst Jϋnger the hardened, World War I 
German soldier.  The tone of his text followed suit, transforming from hopes to events; 
from yearning, to experiencing. 
 Battle soon follows.  The excited Jϋnger was about to see his first real combat 
experience.  He expressed the anxious enthusiasm he felt while preparing and awaiting 
battle.  But as soon as he arrived, it had ended.  The excitement that Jϋnger had was 
that of the yearning to test his nerve and wit against an opponent; to feel that moment 
when either he or his enemy would fall.  He explained: 
The battle of Les Eparges was the first I was in, and it was not at all what I had 
expected.  I had taken part in a great military operation without coming within 
sight of the enemy.  It was later that I experienced hand-to-hand fighting, that 
supreme moment of warfare when the infantryman comes into the open and 
when the chaotic vacancy of the battlefield has its murderous and decisive 
interludes.137 
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Although the battle of Les Eparges was not what Jϋnger had expected and hoped for, 
he would have plenty of hand-to-hand combat to experience throughout his tenure in 
war. 
 Jϋnger then continued to describe the day-to-day life in the trenches.  The 
majority of the text was consumed with the tedium of sleepless nights, taking post duty, 
and having the company of rats, mice, and cats that were not able to escape the fire 
between the trenches.  This monotony was occasionally highlighted with death, a brief 
bit of sleep and rest, some coffee, and some beer swilling.  Even the bit of excitement of 
a soldier manning the post getting shot seemed to have become boring and 
monotonous to Jϋnger.  “One of a post suddenly collapses in a stream of blood, shot in 
the head.  His fellows tear the field-dressing from his tunic and bind him up. […] 
Somebody throws a shovelful of soil over the red patch and every one goes about his 
business.”138   
 Increasing emotional detachment is another theme which Jϋnger portrays in the 
text.  He describes his emotional state and that of the other veteran soldiers in his 
battalion as no longer being “whitefaced”139 and scared; they are now “callous.”140  He 
described the veterans as looking at battle as though it was sport.141  He wrote of 
several stories of how members of his battalion used practical jokes in order to entice 
and eventually anger the English into firing at them, which was clearly an exercise in 
futility.  These examples of emotional detachment are another way that Jϋnger was able 
to depict the horrors of war.  War for Jϋnger became a path to manhood; war was able 
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to toughen boys and turn them into men.  These experiences were necessary for 
Jϋnger to tell his story of war. 
 Jϋnger then detailed some of the most horrible events that he had had to endure 
at Guillemont.  Upon hearing of his platoon’s new station he stated, “I heard a 
monotonous tale of crouching all day in shell-holes with no one on either flank and no 
trenches communicating with the rear, of unceasing attacks, of dead bodies littering the 
ground, of maddening thirst, of wounded and dying, and of a lot besides.”142  This 
portion of the text detailed the most gruesome and horrid tales of his time in World War 
I.  The description Jϋnger gives of his personal guide is that of shock.  Jϋnger describes 
the guide’s appearance: 
The face half-framed by the steel rim of the helmet was unmoved; the voice 
accompanied by the sound of battle droned on, and the impression they made on 
me was one of unearthly solemnity.  One could see that the man had been 
through horror to the limit of despair and there had learnt to despise it.  Nothing 
was left but supreme and superhuman indifference.143 
 
Jϋnger repeatedly described tales of wounded that he states will never escape his 
memory such as tales of his profusely bleeding comrades reaching to him asking for 
help, and Jϋnger knowing there was nothing that he can do to help, or stories of English 
prisoners having to be shot and killed because “going over the top” with a prisoner was 
simply unrealistic – it would only put the prisoner and, more importantly, the German 
soldiers in even more danger.144 
 Though much of the war that Jϋnger portrays was one of death and struggle, 
Jϋnger also spent a brief amount of time expounding another characteristic of war; a 
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characteristic to which Jϋnger attributed his life being saved numerous times.  This 
characteristic was that of luck.  In one memorable glimpse, Jϋnger recollected a day 
when his troop was succumbing to a lengthy bout of shelling from the English.  Jϋnger 
and his battalion retreated to a farm, and when the shelling came to a pause Jϋnger 
describes the events that followed.  “In the evening the same performance [shelling] 
was repeated; only this time, as it was fine, I stood outside the farmhouse.  The next 
shell fell right in the middle of it.”145  Jϋnger then goes on to state, in a rather resonating 
manner, “Such are the chances of war.  Here more than anywhere was a case of little 
causes and great effects.  Seconds and millimetres make the difference.”146 
 Although Storm of Steel is commonly portrayed as solely a memoir of war, it 
could also be considered a collection of life lessons.  Much of what Jϋnger described 
dealt with experiences in which a lesson was taught and though many of these 
experiences occurred by way of war, battle and death, Jϋnger seems to have been 
more interested in the lessons and experiences to be gained.  Though placed in the 
setting of war, many of the lessons and experiences that Jϋnger detailed can be applied 
to multiple scenarios, but since his personal experiences took place in a war setting, it 
was the best way for him to describe them.  Lessons of leadership are strewn 
throughout the entire text, as well as the ideals of personal responsibility.  He mentioned 
at the beginning of the text the significance of speech and rhetoric while in a position of 
leadership.  He stated: 
An officer should never be parted from his men in the moment of danger on any 
account whatever.  Danger is the supreme moment of his career, his chance to 
show his manhood at its best.  Honour and gallantry make him master of the 
hour.  What is more sublime than to face death at the head of a hundred men?  
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Such a one will never find obedience fail him, for courage runs through the ranks 
like wine.147 
 
While he was detailing an event and a speech that was given to him and his fellow 
soldiers, this was a lesson that Jϋnger followed through his entire military career, and 
also a lesson that is applicable in various scenarios.  According to Jϋnger, leadership is 
a characteristic that is universal in the manner that it works.  Strong leadership can put 
sufficient confidence in men to face a struggle of any kind.   
 This advocacy for strong centralized leadership in the military can be paralleled 
to his support for an authoritarian government.  In Storm of Steel, Jϋnger states that he 
believes a strong leader, such as a military officer, is capable of infusing confidence and 
courage into his followers to the extent of overcoming any obstacle.  Transitioning this 
belief into the context of Weimar Germany, it would be inferred that a strong enough 
public leader would be capable of infusing the German people with enough confidence 
and courage to stand up to the status quo of Weimar.  This inference was realized with 
the emergence of Adolf Hitler into the public sphere, and the rise to power of the Nazi 
Party. 
 Storm of Steel is commonly represented as classic National Socialist propaganda 
or idealism; Elliot Neaman and Nikolaus Wachsmann are just two historians that argue 
this point to some extent.  This argument misrepresents what Jϋnger was attempting to 
accomplish in many of his texts.  Although it can be claimed that Jϋnger simply glorifies 
war, instead he is glorifying the existential experience of war and struggle.  He refers to 
his own individual experience, and sometimes the experiences of other soldiers in 
whom he had a significant emotional investment.  Focusing his attention on his own 
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personal experiences throughout the war, he does not put much emphasis on Germany, 
other than the fact that he himself is German fighting with the German forces. 
The ending of the text is particularly important within this discussion.  Jϋnger 
does not end the original version of his text with the Versailles Treaty, or even with 
Germany losing the war.  Instead, he concludes his text with himself receiving the 
prestigious Pour le Mérite on September 18, 1918.  It was not until four years later, in 
1924, that he made an addition to the end of the text,148 namely, a nationalistically 
charged quote: “Though force without and barbarity within conglomerate in somber 
clouds, yet so long the blade of a sword will strike a spark in the night may it be said: 
Germany lives and Germany shall never go under!”149 
This addition is not to be overlooked.  The addition of such openly nationalistic 
tone changes much of the complexion of the text as a whole.  It transforms a text that is 
almost solely concerned with glorifying and aestheticizing the individual experience of 
war, to glorifying the German nation.  This quote transforms an individualistic and 
apolitical Jϋnger, into the Jϋnger that took on the role of one of Germany’s “political 
ideologue[s],”150 and who allegedly “preached the gospel of Auschwitz.”151  The addition 
of this nationalist conclusion to Storm of Steel marked a significant change for much of 
his career.  Jϋnger, through novels and articles became one of the prevailing voices of 
German Nationalism. 
The reasoning behind this transition is due to the inability of the Weimar Republic 
to stabilize the economic and social climate of Germany.  Nationalist groups, most 
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notably the NSDAP, called for radical change under the mantra of nationalism.  These 
groups were in opposition to the “material” and “intellectual…filth” of Weimar.  These 
ideas captivated Jϋnger, and as Wachsmann states, when Jϋnger “had heard Hitler 
speak at a mass meeting in Munich, [he was] deeply impressed by this ‘event of 
elemental force.’”152  With this shift to a radical nationalist stance, Jϋnger thus edited 
Storm of Steel in 1924 in order to reflect his new ideals. 
Although the versions of the text appearing after 1929 had a significantly stronger 
nationalistic tone, the final message that Jϋnger passed along stayed the same.  It was 
the last message that Jϋnger incorporated into his text that finally allowed him to realize 
his position in the world.  It may have taken him four years of fighting in the freezing wet 
trenches of Europe, but he figured out his own identity, something he struggled with 
throughout his youth.  While he was searching for adventure and excitement when he 
was a young boy, he found himself plagued with more confusion.  It took World War I to 
clear the way for Jϋnger to find himself.  Jϋnger described the final lesson he absorbed 
from the war in the following way: 
And almost without any thought of mine, the idea of the Fatherland had been 
distilled from all these afflictions in a clearer and brighter essence.  That was the 
final winnings in a game on which so often all had been asked: the nation was no 
longer for me and empty thought veiled in symbols; and how could it have been 
otherwise when I had seen so many die for its sake, and been schooled myself to 
stake my life for its credit every minute, day and night, without a thought?  And 
so, strange as it may sound, I learned from this very four years’ schooling in force 
and in all the fantastic extravagance of material warfare that life has no depth of 
meaning except when it is pledged for an ideal, and that there are ideals in 
comparison with which the life of an individual and even of a people has no 
weight.  And though the aim for which I fought as an individual, as an atom in the 
whole body of the army, was not to be achieved, though material force cast us, 
apparently, to the earth, yet we learned once and for all to stand for a cause and 
if necessary to fall as befitted men.153 
                                                          
152
 Ernst Jϋnger, Jahre der Okkupation (Stuttgart 1958), 249, quoted in Wachsmann, 577. 
153
 Wachsmann., 316. 
    86 
Though there was a certain amount of nationalistic resolve in it, Jϋnger’s final assertions 
in Storm of Steel are important in order to understand his psyche.  He discovered that 
his role in the world was to fight for and ensure the greatness of Germany.  Jϋnger 
yearned for Germany to once again become a nation at the pinnacle of greatness.   
 Scholarly discussion concerning Jϋnger and Storm of Steel has been contentious 
and controversial.  The perceptions of what Jϋnger was attempting to portray, share, 
and reflect upon is up for debate, but there are several points of consistency throughout 
the debates.  The glorification of war is an evident point.  There is another point of 
emphasis that is often only briefly discussed, if it is discussed at all.  That is the notion 
that Jϋnger wanted to make it clear just how difficult and destructive the First World War 
was, not only on a national and military level, but more importantly on a personal level.   
 As we have already seen, the Weimar years in Germany were not very 
welcoming for German veterans of World War I.  For many of the men who had fought 
in the war, the Treaty of Versailles took much of their lives away due to the drastic 
reduction of the German military.  Veterans no longer had jobs or income that they 
could rely upon.  On top of that was their physical and mental fitness.  Many veterans 
were injured or deformed, and in a Weimar Germany that put increasing emphasis on 
beauty, where did that put all of these men?  In addition, with the debts the German 
government incurred in order to finance the war effort, as well as the reparations that 
were demanded from Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, there were no funds that 
could be spared for these men.  Their mental and psychological condition is not always 
brought up in this discussion either.  These soldiers lived for years in trenches, covered 
in mud while dodging constant shelling and gunfire.  Surprised, but also relieved, when 
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the war ended and Germany defeated, the return home for many men proved difficult.  
Coming home, especially with the “Stab-in-the-Back” legend that became so popular, 
made it even more difficult for the men to integrate back into society. 
 Is it possible that Jϋnger may have composed and published this compilation of 
his personal war memoirs in order to give himself, as well as other World War I 
veterans, an identity within society?  By creating this text, Jϋnger essentially gave the 
reader a sample of war; an illustration of the war that so many German World War I 
veterans had to fight, survived, and the memories they had to live with.  He consistently 
stated how difficult the war was to endure, repeatedly declaring that World War I was 
“no child’s-play.”154  Jϋnger discussed the sacrifices that he and his fellow soldiers 
made throughout the war.  Though he never deflects the blame to anyone or anything 
else for his own personal choices in joining the war efforts, he asserted: 
Our losses in young officers were again frightfully heavy during these days.  
Every time afterwards that I heard prejudice and depreciation on the lips of the 
mob, I thought of these men who saw it out to the bitter end with so little parade 
and with so fine an ardour.  But after all—what is the mob?  It sees in everything 
nothing but the reflection of its own manners.  It is quite clear to me that these 
men were our best.  However cleverly people may talk and write, there is nothing 
to set against self-sacrifice that is not pale, insipid, and miserable.155 
 
This emotional description of the war appeared to be a salute to those men who fell and 
gave their lives to their country and their cause.  It is easy, through this statement, to 
see the chasm between those at home and those who fought on the front lines.  This 
chasm generated a sense of contempt that was held by many soldiers upon returning 
home; a contempt that could easily be channeled against the supporters of Weimar by 
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military leaders such as Hindenburg, or those who aestheticized and glorified war, such 
as Hitler.156 
Storm of Steel, other than being a great personal literary achievement for Ernst 
Jϋnger, is seen by many scholars157 as expressing the personal and political ideals of 
Jϋnger.  When questions concerning Jϋnger and his ideologies are posed, Storm of 
Steel is often times the “evidence” of what Jϋnger would supposedly believe or pursue.  
According to these historians, the memoir contains answers hidden in its contents and 
its style.   
 An already controversial figure due to his glorification of war and the war 
experience becomes more controversial due to what some scholars believe is a push 
for a National Socialist revolution.  Due to the glorification of war in Storm of Steel it 
seems almost natural to compare the text to the ideals and virtues instilled by Adolf 
Hitler and the National Socialist German Worker’s Party.   
 In this work alone, there are several different levels on which to compare Jϋnger 
and National Socialism.  The glorification of war is the most obvious of these levels, but 
is also the shallowest.  It is simple to see the connection between Jϋnger and the Nazis 
on the surface.  Throughout the latter editions of Storm of Steel Jϋnger details the 
greatness of war and how “there is no lovelier a death in the world”158 than to die for 
Germany.  On this level, there are certain parallels to National Socialism, but there are 
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also certain misrepresentations.  In both Jϋnger’s text and the ideals of Hitler’s National 
Socialism there exists a glorification of war and struggle.  The misrepresentation of this 
premise is based on the nature of this glorification.  Hitler argues that war is a national 
endeavor; a national experience for the betterment of Germany.  In contrast, Jϋnger 
asserts, specifically in his first edition, that war is glorified solely as an individual 
experience.  Nikolaus Wachsmann, who comes to a similar conclusion, states: 
For Hitler and other leading Nazis, the war was in the first place a national 
experience, and they focused on its political outcome: the fight against the 
republic domestically and against the Versailles settlement abroad.  In contrast, 
Jϋnger in his early works never instrumentalizes war for political ends—the main 
aim for Jϋnger the writer is the heroisation of Jϋnger the Soldier.159 
 
This contrast in ideals is also present when looking at Hitler’s ideological treatise Mein 
Kampf160 and the alleged ideological treatise of Jϋnger, Storm of Steel.  In Mein Kampf  
Hitler argues that “his personal experience is entirely subsumed in the national 
disaster”161 of losing World War I, and that he declares that the day of German defeat in 
World War I was the first time he had shed tears since the funeral of his mother.162  
Jϋnger, however takes a different approach to the end of World War I.  In contrast to 
Hitler, who saw World War I as a “national disaster,” Jϋnger concludes his original 
treatise with “Jϋnger’s personal triumph of being awarded the Pour le Mérite.”163   
 On this level, which Wachsmann describes as being “superficial,”164 there are 
some basic similarities, but when examined in more detail, Jϋnger and Hitler have very 
different opinions.  Hitler asserts that war is important on a political level where the 
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struggle is a national struggle.  In contrast, Jϋnger believes that war is a struggle for 
personal survival and individual merits.  Whereas Hitler views World War I as an utter 
disappointment and failure, Jϋnger views it, especially in his early editions of Storm of 
Steel, as a success filled with personal achievements, honors, and quenching his thirst 
for adventure.   
 Storm of Steel is a text that is essential to review when examining post-World 
War I Germany, or the Weimar Republic, and even proves to be useful in any general 
examination of war.  In Germany, Storm of Steel was an instant sensation for Jϋnger.  
His work allowed people to realize what soldiers in the Great War had endured.  It 
allowed the citizens at home to relate to, and sympathize with, the soldiers who returned 
home after the war and, in the case of Germany, after defeat.  Storm of Steel was a 
work that comprised a wide array of literary themes.  On a superficial level the text 
appeared to be a simple list of experiences and emotions felt by a soldier at the 
frontlines of war.  If nothing more, Storm of Steel gave Jϋnger publicity and a platform to 
proliferate some of his later arguments and ideologies.    Although Storm of Steel is 
probably Jϋnger’s most controversial and popular text, to understand his place in 





 Though Storm of Steel is arguably Jϋnger’s most noteworthy composition due to 
his aestheticization of war and death, he often reflected on his frontline experiences in 
    91 
his other early works.  Another of Jϋnger’s texts that is necessary to include in any 
examination of Jϋnger is The Worker, which was published in 1932.165  This is Jϋnger’s 
“last and final reflection on the battlefield experience in the trenches of World War I.”166  
The Worker is another example of controversial writing.  Much like Storm of Steel, there 
is much in this text that anticipates the National Socialist State.  As Elliot Neaman 
describes it, “The Worker was Jϋnger’s most protofascist book.”167  Late in his career 
Jϋnger must have realized the parallels between this text and the Nazi state and he had 
the text blocked from being translated to other languages (including English).168 
 The Worker is Ernst Jϋnger’s argument for a totalitarian state which is run by 
wartime front soldiers, workers, and their leaders.  Thomas Nevin allocates the phrase 
“cybernetic storm troops”169 to this group.  For Jϋnger, the text is a glimpse into the near 
future of what the political and social spheres of Germany could, and according to 
Jϋnger, should, look like.  As he began composing Der Arbeiter in October of 1930,170 
Jϋnger was taking the position of “a distant observer, detecting global historical-
metaphysical movements.”171  According to Jϋnger, this distance was essential due to 
the fact that “daily German politics became too insignificant to be of interest” to himself; 
an attitude typical among conservative intellectuals who often prided themselves on 
taking an “apolitical” stance.  He was looking at a large-scale interpretation of global 
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politics.  Jϋnger also points to this distance from Weimar politics that he created while 
composing Der Arbeiter in order to defend some of the theories he illustrates in the text.   
 Der Arbeiter is Jϋnger’s call for the soldier-worker to rise up.  The Worker,172 
according to Jϋnger, “is neither a social class nor an economic force, but simply the 
type of soldier, also called warrior, who fought in the trenches of war that had functioned 
as a melting pot, in which the petit bourgeois, the peasant, and the proletarian stood 
shoulder to shoulder.”173  For Jϋnger the Worker embodied the same virtues of the 
soldier; discipline and self-sacrifice.  The Worker was also not simply a German 
phenomenon.  Jϋnger believed that the Worker would come to rule in countries 
throughout the globe, and essentially rule the world.  He believed that due to Germany’s 
political history, it was the perfect social and political climate for such a change.  Jϋnger 
maintained that since Germany was never truly a liberal-bourgeois society, it is the only 
country where the Worker is ready to rule (the Soviet Union ranks a distant second).174 
 Jϋnger believed that the process of generating a dependency on the Worker in 
Germany had already begun taking place during the Weimar years.  Jϋnger argued that 
the modern world would increase the “predictability, efficiency, and discipline”175 of the 
Worker.  The one necessary piece of the puzzle that Jϋnger believed was missing was 
that of a “‘young and ruthless leadership’ to lead the way to a new state … where 
‘military discipline’ and ‘labor duty’ would be implemented ‘from top to bottom.’”176  Here, 
it is apparent that Jϋnger is advocating a party much like the NSDAP. 
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Although on the surface it may appear to be a sign of political affiliation for 
Jϋnger, it is again important to reflect on context.  During the composition of The 
Worker, the socio-economic climate was deplorable.  As a result of the stock-market 
crash of 1929, Germany, along with much of the rest of the world, was in great financial 
crisis.  Included in that was the steeply rising rate of unemployment.  Like many on the 
right, Jϋnger already despised the Weimar Republic and he became even more critical 
of it due to its inability to rise out of the depression.  Not only was The Worker a call for 
a governing system that was dynamically different than that of Weimar, it also instilled 
some of the traditions and virtues of the old Prussian state that oversaw great economic 
growth leading up to World War I.  With steep unemployment rates, a vision such as 
Jϋnger’s, which emphasized the importance of the workforce and promises an influx of 
employment opportunities, would surely draw interest.  These contextual issues are 
often ignored by historians such as Neaman, Wachsmann, and Kittler in their 
interpretations of The Worker.   
 Wolf Kittler makes a relatively important observation in his article noting that The 
Worker is significantly different from Jϋnger’s previous texts, especially Storm of Steel.  
The difference Kittler observes is that The Worker reads like a manifesto that “aims at 
predicting the future destiny of mankind on planet earth in the age of technology,”177 
whereas Storm of Steel and many of his other previous texts are lucid examinations on 
his past personal experiences.  Some commentators, such as Kittler and Wachsmann, 
view this distinct shift in Jϋnger’s writing style as a more direct parallel between his 
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views and the ideologies of National Socialism, although Jϋnger was careful to refrain 
from ever mentioning a specific party in The Worker.178   
The conclusion that is drawn by many, including Neaman, Wachsmann, and 
Kittler, is that it is the text “was Jϋnger’s most protofascist book.”179  Looking specifically 
and solely at the text, this is an acceptable conclusion.  There are many examples 
throughout the text that directly anticipate National Socialism.  What these accounts of 
The Worker lack, is a contextual interpretation.  By contextualizing The Worker, the 
interpretation is strengthened.  Jϋnger, as in the vast majority of his other texts and 
articles, is arguing for a radical change from the Weimar Republic, and in the case of 
The Worker, is arguing for a transformation very comparable to the change maintained 





 Storm of Steel, although it is Jϋnger’s first and arguably most influential and 
recognized work, is far from being the only one of importance.  A work that is arguably 
just as important is On the Marble Cliffs,180 first published in 1939.  In comparison to 
Storm of Steel, it is strikingly different; in fact they are near opposites in many respects.  
On the Marble Cliffs is a fictitious story whereas Storm of Steel is a memoir compiled of 
Jϋnger’s own personal war diaries and notations.  On the Marble Cliffs is also widely 
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thought of today as a parable of the times in which it was written, and as part of a 
hidden agenda held by Jϋnger, whereas Storm of Steel is widely recognized for simply 
being firsthand encounters and experiences of what Jϋnger faced at war.  Finally, and 
possibly the most important difference between these two works by Jϋnger is the fact 
that, while Storm of Steel is driven by individuality and adventure, On the Marble Cliffs 
suggests a definite political and societal milieu. 
 On the Marble Cliffs is a novel composed by Ernst Jϋnger in the years following 
the collapse of the Weimar Republic.  First published in 1939, the text was relatively 
popular selling approximately 35,000 copies in the spring of 1940 alone.181  Although 
the work showed some promise in terms of sales, the “authorities” stopped further 
printing of the text after the spring of 1940.182  The reason for the discontinuation of 
printing is most certainly due to the material that was in the text.  Though Jϋnger denied 
the idea that the text was an attack on the Nazi party, it is relatively certain that the 
“fictitious” novel was indeed a parable of the late 1920s and early 1930s in Germany.   
 On the Marble Cliffs begins with a rather lengthy description of the setting.  The 
majority of the text takes place in and around the Marble Cliffs, including the hermitage 
and herbarium of the narrator.  The narrator, who is most definitely a “fictitious” Ernst 
Jϋnger, lives with his brother Ortho, his cook and house-keeper, Lampusa, and the 
narrator’s illegitimate “love-child” Erio.  The narrator and Ortho were soldiers and had 
just returned from war at the “Campagna.”  Their goal was to simply live a “life of 
leisure.”183  The two brothers would consume their time in the research of botany, 
ichthyology, and entomology.  Not surprisingly, these were the same scientific studies in 
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which Jϋnger immersed himself when returning from the war.  Jϋnger even was able to 
include some of his botanical and entomological research within the parameters of the 
text. 
 Just on the other side of the Marble Cliffs was the town of Mauretania.  Several 
times throughout the work, the narrator and Ortho travel to the town and on one 
occasion the narrator introduces the chief antagonist of the text, Chief Ranger, the 
Grand Master of Mauretania.  Chief Ranger is undoubtedly a characterization of Adolf 
Hitler.  Chief Ranger is always portrayed in a dark light; rendered as a strong and witty 
villain, intimidating everyone in his path.  He is the leading politician with a large 
following of thugs whom no one dares oppose.  He and his gang are traveling through 
Mauretania gathering “support” for his crusade through the area towards the Marina, the 
Marble Cliffs, and ultimately the hermitage of the narrator.  The narrator, brother Ortho 
and the other members of the hermitage meet Chief Ranger and his following, and 
combat ensues at the conclusion of the text. 
 The material enveloped in this relatively short novel is essential to the 
examination at hand.  Not only is this text clearly an attack on National Socialism and 
Hitler himself, it also puts Ernst Jϋnger in the role leading the aforementioned attack.  
From the very first paragraph to the end of the text, Jϋnger voices his own ideologies 
and desires. 
 In the very first paragraph of On the Marble Cliffs, the narrator reminisces about 
“times of happiness.”184  The narrator soon qualifies “times of happiness” as the times 
before the war broke out.  Though this is a very brief flashback, it is noteworthy.  If 
interpreted as a parody of the National Socialist takeover, the war, “Campagna” as it is 
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labeled in the text, is none other than World War I.  Thus, the “times of happiness” that 
the narrator, or Jϋnger, is alluding to would correspond to pre-World War I Germany.  In 
just this very small segment of the first chapter of On Marble Cliffs, the reader can 
identify some of Jϋnger’s basic values.  Jϋnger yearned for Germany to revert back to 
the days of glory, the days of the great German Reich.  Of course, with his affinity for a 
militaristic, centralized state, this is no surprise.  On the Marble Cliffs clearly shows the 
connection of the “fictional” text to the ideologies of Jϋnger.  Neaman reflects on the text 
in a sympathetic manner defending Jϋnger with the notion that On the Marble Cliffs 
could be interpreted in many different ways.185  Though there are definite qualities and 
characteristics of a fictional novel in On the Marble Cliffs, Jϋnger includes a plethora of 
personal ideals within it.  Writers such as Wachsmann and Thomas Nevin conclude that 
the text was a turning point for Jϋnger, and his “inner emigration”186 away from Nazism. 
 On the Marble Cliffs, also follows a historical timeline that is, in fact, extremely 
similar to the historical timeline of Germany from the 1920s to the 1930s.  Through 
means of recollections, the narrator continually mentions events that either happened in 
Germany, or in Jϋnger’s personal or political life during the same time period.  These 
recollections of the narrator can be construed in various ways, whether it be an 
explanation, an apology, or an acknowledgement of respect.  The use of vocabulary is 
also important in this examination as Jϋnger uses specific language in order to elicit a 
certain response from the reader.   
 Towards the beginning of the text, in chapter seven, the narrator begins to 
discuss the power and aims of Chief Ranger and his “Order.”  In a memorable section, 
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the narrator details how he and his brother Ortho once were attracted to the order lead 
by Chief Ranger, and how it was a mistake.  He states: 
Later I was to hear Brother Ortho say of our Mauretanian period that mistakes 
become errors only when persisted in.  It was a saying that gained in truth for me 
when I thought back to our position when the Order attracted us.  There are 
periods of decline when the pattern fades to which our inmost life must conform.  
When we enter upon them we sway and lose our balance.  From hollow joy we 
sink to leaden sorrow, and past and future acquire a new charm from our sense 
of loss.  So we wander aimlessly in the irretrievable past or in distant Utopias; but 
the fleeting moment we cannot grasp.187 
 
This example is similar to the first as it is another illustration of how Jϋnger used On the 
Marble Cliffs as a stage to present his own personal views.  On a superficial level, the 
narrator is explaining how he and Ortho used to be attracted to the stances and 
prospects of Chief Ranger’s order, and how it was a lapse in judgment.  Examining 
slightly deeper, this can easily be seen as Jϋnger’s personal excuse for his initial 
fascination with the National Socialist organization.  This is important on two levels.  
First, Jϋnger is actually conceding his interest and fascination with the National Socialist 
group, and secondly, he is essentially stating that through all of the appeal, the 
organization was unable to perform in the manner that he had expected. 
In this statement Jϋnger is also admitting his error.  He states that in “periods of 
decline…we sway and lose our balance.”188  He is essentially arguing that he was 
fascinated with the National Socialist group due to the “decline” of Germany.  His 
argument fundamentally is based on the premise that because the Weimar Republic 
was failing to lead Germany out of the disrepute of losing a war and multiple 
depressions, the most sensible action to take at the time was to search for a group that 
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demanded change in the most radical sense.  Jϋnger appears to be excusing his 
National Socialist sympathies by qualifying them with the human condition of suffering 
from weakness during time of hardship; Jϋnger is arguing that his sympathies for 
National Socialism were due to the fact that he desired change so intensely that he 
became corrupt.   
Soon after, the narrator paints a picture for the reader of the aim of the 
Mauretanians.  The narrator states that “among the aims of the Mauretanians was 
artistry in the dealings of this world.  They demanded that power should be exercised 
dispassionately as by a god, and correspondingly its schools produced a race of spirits 
who were bright, untrammeled, but always terrible.”189  Again, it is essential to the topic 
to relate this section to its context, and what Jϋnger was actually attempting to portray.  
The Mauretanians in On the Marble Cliffs are the followers of Chief Ranger.  Thus, if 
Chief Ranger represents Adolf Hitler, the Mauretanians logically represent the various 
factions and sectors of the Nazi Party, including the S.S. and the Gestapo.  What 
Jϋnger is discussing in this brief quotation is the exercising and training of the Nazis. 
Jϋnger also briefly attacks the thought that liberal deliberation is unnecessary.  In 
the quote “power should be exercised dispassionately as by a god,”190 Jϋnger seems to 
be put off by the theory.  Schmitt and Heidegger would most certainly believe that power 
should be used in this manner in order to remove the democratic deliberation process.  
Although there is another way in which it could be interpreted (as we shall see 
momentarily), Jϋnger gives the impression in this quote that the implementation of 
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power in such an emotionless manner leads to an almost inhuman state in which there 
is a divide between the people and the goals of the regime.   
The second part of this quote is also important.  The narrator states, 
“correspondingly its schools produced a race of spirits who were bright, untrammeled, 
but always terrible.”191  This portion of the quote has two connections.  First, this quote 
is just one example of an ongoing theme of the ruthlessness and emotionless “Nazi” 
figures: whether it was ravaging villages or using intimidation to gain political support.  
This portion of the quote can also be paralleled to the Rectorship of Martin Heidegger.  
As has been previously discussed, Martin Heidegger was elected Rector of the 
University of Freiburg by his colleagues.  The Nazi Party understood how important it 
was to impose their beliefs on the best and brightest young minds of the state.  One of 
the most efficient ways to implement this intention was to control the information that 
was being communicated to university students.  Heidegger became one of the leaders 
of this operation by essentially creating a sort of “boot camp” for promising students who 
were to become future leaders of the Nazi University system.192  Jϋnger is stating that, 
while these young minds were supposed to be filled with the knowledge of the world, 
they were instead learning only what was communicated to them by Nazi leaders.  Not 
only were they being taught these ideals and philosophies, but at the same time, Jϋnger 
points out that they were being taught how to implement those theories in the worst 
possible ways.   
When the narrator discusses the thought of resisting the growing party of Chief 
Ranger, he states that “many had, indeed, thought of resistance, but in such cases, 
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plunderings had occurred which were apparently conducted according to a considered 
plan.”193  He also states that “it became clear how weak the law was in comparison to 
anarchy.”194  Both of these quotations are important due to the fact that they show how 
influential the Nazi Party had become.  The first quote suggests that the group would 
maliciously put down any resistance, even if it meant murder.  The second quote is 
more important for our concerns here, for two reasons.  On a superficial level it 
suggests that the strength of the National Socialist Party had grown to new levels and 
that the law was unable to control it.  On a deeper level, it is important to examine what 
Jϋnger is actually comparing.  “Anarchy” in this comparison is undoubtedly the Chief 
Ranger, or the National Socialist Party.  On another level, Jϋnger is comparing the 
NSDAP to “law.”  The only logical entity to which Jϋnger could be referring is the 
Weimar Republic.  Thus, Jϋnger is essentially stating that the Weimar Republic was not 
nearly strong enough to withstand any sort of anarchy, especially a group such as the 
National Socialists.195  Although these passages may appear to be sympathetic to the 
Nazis, it is much more of an attack on the Weimar Republic.  Jϋnger is attacking the 
legitimacy of the Weimar Republic due to the fact that it could not protect the people 
against an uprising.  This sentiment is also based upon the fact that the Weimar 
Republic succumbed to series of depressions that left the state in shambles.   
The narration then turns to the veterans of the war.  The narrator details the 
routes taken by many of the war veterans: 
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Thereupon it became apparent that the men of the Campagna already had their 
representatives in the Marina, for returning citizens had either retained business 
connections with the herdsmen or joined the clans by taking the blood oath.  This 
group, too, followed the change for evil, particularly wherever order was already 
undermined.196 
 
The inclusion of a discussion concerning the war veterans for Jϋnger is not a surprise, 
and it is not difficult to see the most important phrase in this section of writing.  “The 
blood oath” to which Jϋnger refers in this section of writing has a definite National 
Socialist tone.  Jϋnger also declares that those veterans who took “the blood oath” also 
“followed the change for evil.”  This is significant for him due to his affinity towards 
veterans of war throughout his career.  What Jϋnger is attempting to show within this 
section is that even the most pride-filled, virtuous veterans of war were enticed by the 
promise and influence that the Nation Socialist commanded. 
 The narrator then expounds further on the resistance that was shown towards 
Chief Ranger and the Mauretanians.  The narrator explains: 
Soon one had the impression that they hardly regarded one another any longer 
as human beings, and their speech was shot through with words fit to be used 
only of vermin that must be harried and stamped out with fire and sword.  Only in 
their opponents could they recognize murder; yet they themselves vaunted of 
things which in others they despise.  While one held the other’s dead scarcely 
worthy of hasty burial in the dead of night, their own were to be shrouded in 
purple, the eburnum was to sound out and the eagle soar, bearing to the gods a 
living image of the hero and prophet.197 
 
 
The rhetoric in this sample from On the Marble Cliffs gives an immediate illusion of the 
Holocaust; how the Nazis viewed the Jews as “vermin,” not even deserving of a proper 
burial due to their “inhuman” race.  Although On the Marble Cliffs was composed before 
the “Final Solution” in Hitler’s Germany came to its apex, the sentiment of anti-Semitism 
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was commonplace throughout Germany.  Reichspogromnacht had also already 
occurred on November 9-10, 1938.  As well as the connection that is easily drawn to the 
rampant anti-Semitism, which the NSDAP propagated, the secondary issue that is 
presented is the manner in which their own were memorialized.  The extravagance 
described by the narrator appears to be an attempt to express how self-righteous the 
NSDAP was.  A good example of such self-righteousness is the burial service in which 
every member is to be “shrouded in purple, the eburnum was to sound out and the 
eagle soar,” and each were to be treated as if they were “a living image of the hero and 
prophet.”198  The narrator gives the impression that he is obviously troubled by the 
difference in memorials, even though both parties are human. 
 While Chief Ranger consistently gains popularity and followers, the narrator 
makes an assertion.  He states that “terror had complete sway under the mask of 
order.”199  This is one of the most striking statements that Jϋnger makes through the 
entire text.  Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists, as well as their fictional counterparts 
Chief Ranger and the Mauretanians, are commonly characterized as thugs.  They 
played the part of the classical corrupt political party using threats and muscle in order 
to gain support.  Support would increase to the point where the party would also gain 
some legitimacy, and with legitimacy, the party would achieve the illusion of order.  
While the NSDAP gained an illusion of order, Jϋnger is arguing that it is just that; an 
illusion.200 
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 Chief Ranger is the ultimate antagonist for the narrator.  He commands so much 
power and authority that he strikes fear into everyone he passes.  The text ends with a 
battle between Chief Ranger along with the Mauretanians, against the narrator, brother 
Ortho, and those of their hermitage.  In attempts to depict the power and authority of 
Chief Ranger, the narrator states that “To all these [(the Mauretanians)] the Ranger was 
lord and master, to be kissed on the hem of his red hunting coat.”201  Not only does this 
show the shear amount of authority and respect the Chief Ranger commands from his 
followers, but the rhetoric, again shows the connection between Chief Ranger and Adolf 
Hitler.   
With all of the thinly-veiled criticisms of Nazism that can be found throughout On 
the Marble Cliffs, the question that must be posed is why.  Why would Ernst Jϋnger, a 
man who had so many ideological similarities and wrote several sympathetically 
charged articles towards the Nazis in Nationalist periodicals, compose such an 
allegory?  Perhaps the most reasonable response would be that Jϋnger, at the time of 
composition, had become increasingly critical of the Nazis.  As previously discussed, 
Jϋnger did not agree with everything the National Socialists were doing to gain power or 
their social visions once power was obtained.  He believed that they were unnecessarily 
forceful in gaining and enforcing their power.  Due to this, it would not be unreasonable 
to think that Jϋnger could write a novel such as On the Marble Cliffs in order to question 
the Nazi Party and their policies. 
Jϋnger desired changed in Germany, not unlike much of the rest of the German 
people during the Weimar Republic.  When a radical group such as the NSDAP 
emerged and began to grow, many German people saw a glimpse of hope—that the 
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NSDAP would be able to overthrow the centrally weak Weimar Republic.  Although 
Weimar was overthrown, the NSDAP proved to be much more radical than the German 
people had initially expected and hoped for.  For Jϋnger not only were some of the 
policies they put in place too aggressive, but the basic means by which they gained 
power was also much too aggressive.  These are the issues that Jϋnger is dealing with 
in On the Marble Cliffs. 
Another question that must be explained is how the text became available to the 
public at all.  One explanation that Elliot Neaman offers is that Jϋnger incorporated 
enough National Socialist ideals throughout the text in order for Nazi officials to permit 
the text.  Another possible factor was that Hitler held a great affinity for Jϋnger.  It is 
improbable, but possible that Hitler could have protected Jϋnger from persecution for 
the text, as well as kept the text in print due to his admiration for the writer, and due to 





 The discussion concerning Ernst Jϋnger is one full of controversy.  Of the three 
intellectuals examined in this study, his ideologies may have had the most similarities 
with those of National Socialism.  Although this may be the case, he is also the only one 
of the three intellectuals who did not officially join the National Socialist Party for any 
period of time. 
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 Central to this examination is the discussion of Jϋnger’s apparent shift in views.  
The first indication of his political and philosophical ideals found in Storm of Steel 
suggests a glorification of war and struggle that is very comparable to the view of the 
NSDAP.  This glorification of war is what Jϋnger is commonly notorious for, but is 
generally a superficial and incomplete description of his views on war.  The original 
version of Storm of Steel argued that the event of war is an experience based upon the 
individual.  Whereas the Nazi Party portrayed war as a national experience, Jϋnger 
believed that war is to be made by the individuals that were fighting it; the experience of 
war should be expressed by the men who lived and died, and the personal 
achievements that were made. 
 An apparent shift, most reasonably caused by Jϋnger’s personal abhorrence for 
the Weimar Republic and bureaucracy as a whole, then occurred.  As opposed to 
celebrating the individual experience of war in Storm of Steel, Jϋnger essentially altered 
a primary premise of his text; he added more nationalist rhetoric.  The most evident is 
the addition of the last lines of the text which read, “We stand for what will be and for 
what has been.  Though force without and barbarity within conglomerate in sombre 
clouds, yet so long as the blade of a sword will strike a spark in the night may it be said :  
Germany lives and Germany shall never go under!”202  The addition of such 
nationalistically charged elements increases the similarities between Jϋnger and 
National Socialism for obvious reasons.  No longer did he argue that war was solely an 
individual experience, but also a national experience. 
 This increase in nationalist tendencies is rooted in his disdain for the Weimar 
Republic.  The rapid growth in popularity of the NSDAP as well as their radical views 
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enticed Jϋnger to compose essays and articles which were commonly found in a variety 
of nationalist journals and periodicals.  The vast majority of these articles urged the 
support for nationalist parties in their attempts to change the German state.  In 1923, 
Jϋnger published his first article in the NSDAP’s daily newspaper, the Völkischer 
Beobachter.  In the article entitled “Revolution and Idea,” Jϋnger condemns the 
“annoying spectacle”203 of the Weimar Republic.  He states, 
“The real revolution has not yet occurred.  Its forward march cannot be halted…its idea 
is the völkische, sharpened to as yet unknown hardness, its banner is the swastika, its 
expression is the concentration of the will in a single point—the dictatorship.”204  Not 
only is Jϋnger condemning the Republic as early as 1923, but he is also advocating a 
dictatorship under the symbol of the swastika.   
The National Socialists then presumably lost Jϋnger’s interest.  Nikolaus 
Wachsmann examines how the relationship between Jϋnger and the Nazis had become 
strained.  He argues that the majority of the tension was caused by the relationship that 
Hitler and the Nazis maintained with democratic states.  Wachsmann believes that 
Jϋnger saw this as entirely unacceptable.  He states “his stance ruled out any co-
operation with the Weimar state and the bourgeois system, once more highlighting the 
influence of war on Jϋnger’s attitude towards politics.  He saw no room for compromise, 
neither on the battlefield nor in politics.”205  Though Wachsmann argues this position for 
Jϋnger’s stance in the early to mid-1920s, Jϋnger’s text On the Marble Cliffs shows an 
opposing disposition.   
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 On the Marble Cliffs, an allegory notably published after the National Socialists 
assumed power, provides another shift for Jϋnger.  Whereas Wachsmann argues that 
Jϋnger believed that the Nazis were not being radical enough in the 1920s, this allegory 
portrays a Jϋnger in the 1930s as believing the Nazis were much too radical, specifically 
in their attempts to ascertain authority.  On the Marble Cliffs is essentially an attack on 
the legitimacy of Nazi power.  Elliot Neaman refers to this attack as the “Jϋnger-debate” 
as his intentions are not clear,206 but there is a definite attack on the legitimacy of Nazi 
authority due to Nazi abuse of power.   
 Ernst Jϋnger made a name for himself with The Storm of Steel which launched 
his intellectual and writing career.  The magnitude of his popularity is noteworthy in this 
examination due to the amount of influence that he would be able to exploit.  Particularly 
in his texts from the 1920s-30s, the nationalist tendencies are both abundant and 
essential.  Jϋnger also exploited his popularity to endorse radical nationalism.  As has 
been pointed out, although he did not endorse National Socialism exclusively, he did 
endorse many of the principles the Nazis supported.   
 With the last major shift in Jϋnger’s ideals, he was able to attack the legitimacy of 
Nazi power in Germany.  On the Marble Cliffs was able to reach the same audience of 
readers from Jϋnger’s past, but also attract a new audience as well; National 
Socialism’s opponents.  This text is not only an attack on Nazi programs, but it can also 
easily be comprehended as a call for resistance against further persecution at Nazi 
hands.   
 The influence of Ernst Jϋnger is undeniable.  From Storm of Steel, through the 
nationalist periodicals in which he published many articles, to On the Marble Cliffs, he 
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was able to amass a large and diverse audience for his opinions and views.  
Contextually, his audience was in a similar situation as Jϋnger was himself.  He surely 
maintained a strong following from war veterans for obvious reasons.  Along with his 
military brethren, with whom he shared the experience of the trenches, he also certainly 
had an audience in those who yearned for a change from the constant depressions and 
inflations under the Weimar Republic.  Subsequently, he also ascertained an anti-Nazi 
audience from On the Marble Cliffs.  With these audiences in mind, the influence that 
Ernst Jϋnger had is indisputable.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jϋnger were indisputably influential 
during Weimar and National Socialist Germany.  Though they used different styles and, 
at times, different mediums, there are various similarities between these three men.  
Although they took different life and career paths, these differences, in several cases, 
led them to similar arguments.  In conclusion, these similarities, along with some 
differences, will be examined in order to illustrate how all three of them  provided a 
foundation for popularizing conservative revolutionary ideas.   
 One of the most glaring similarities that can be seen through texts of Schmitt, 
Heidegger, and Jϋnger is the call for a dictator.  Schmitt composed his text The Dictator 
in which he explains historically how a strong authority figure can legitimately gain 
power on behalf of the people.  Heidegger describes, in Being and Time, how and why 
a strong leader would be necessary in his process of creating a “community of destiny.”  
This leader would be essential to the process in order to keep the renewed and 
“authentic” people on course.  This leader would mold the people’s Weltanschauung, 
effectively creating a homogenous society that would be able to uncritically conform to a 
single leader.  Jϋnger dedicated much of Storm of Steel to the idea of leadership and 
discipline.  Throughout the text Jϋnger repeatedly states the importance of leadership 
qualities and aestheticizes and glorifies the theme of following a powerful leader through 
tough times. 
 Along with these suggestions concerning centralized power and dictatorship, 
come their oppositions to parliamentary procedure.  Schmitt specifically has a 
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pronounced distaste for the entire institution of liberal parliament.  In The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy Schmitt criticizes the basis of parliament: representative 
deliberation.  Heidegger echoes this sentiment with his discussion of creating a 
“community of destiny.”  When he discusses the process of the “authentic” people 
coming together in order to form a renewed and united community in the last third of 
Being and Time, he is essentially stripping them of all political representation.  Although 
Heidegger would surely argue that the community as a whole would have the same 
political desires, it is a thinly veiled attack on liberal deliberation, illustrating that through 
such a process riddled with compromises, the community as a whole is unsatisfied.  
Jϋnger also attacks the process of representative deliberation.  In the mind of Jϋnger, 
he views that in politics, just as in war, there is no time or reason for deliberation and 
compromise.  In Storm of Steel and Der Arbeiter, Jϋnger illustrates that decisions and 
politics should be decided by the few in power.  In his earlier works, he glorifies 
decisions made dispassionately by those in power because unemotional decisions are 
the greatest decisions. 
 The theme of mortality is another similarity that is found within the texts of Martin 
Heidegger and Ernst Jϋnger.  Mortality, for Jϋnger, plays a major role for his process of 
creating a renewed nation.  The second stage in his renewal process was recovering 
one’s individual self and authenticity by facing one’s mortality.  Realizing one’s mortality, 
for Heidegger, is the only way to become “authentic” and thus join the renewed 
“community of destiny.”  This importance on mortality is paralleled by Jϋnger in Storm of 
Steel.  In the text Jϋnger strongly suggests that an individual cannot be considered alive 
until that individual personally faces the prospect of death.   
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 Another important parallel that can be seen between the writings of Heidegger 
and Jϋnger is the eventual dissolution of individuality.  In the first sections of Being and 
Time, Heidegger calls for the radically individualized, “authentic” Dasein.  In the last 
sections Heidegger calls for a collectivized Dasein of the “community of destiny.”  This 
transformation that is seen in Being and Time is also seen in Jϋnger’s Storm of Steel.  
In the first edition of the text, Jϋnger stresses the importance of individuality and 
individual experiences and achievements.  The 1924 edition of Storm of Steel shows a 
transformation similar  to the one that Heidegger would later call for.  The 1924 edition 
includes an extreme nationalistic tenor, specifically located within the final lines of the 
text.   
 Perhaps the most important parallel that is vivid throughout the writings and life 
paths of Schmitt, Heidegger, and Jϋnger is their outright abhorrence of the Weimar 
Republic.  With the exception of Carl Schmitt’s rather lackluster claims later in life that 
he supported the Weimar Republic while it was in effect, all three of these men 
vehemently opposed the ideals upon which the republic was based.  Through all of their 
writings there are attacks posed against Weimar; specifically against a representative, 
parliamentary style government.  Schmitt was one of the strongest in his opposition to 
the liberal parliamentary system.  Heidegger also launched attacks against the 
representative style government through his writings, although they were in 
philosophical format.  Jϋnger also attacked the Weimar Republic, but using a different 
technique.  In Storm of Steel Jϋnger appealed to the emotional baggage carried over 
after the loss of World War I in the minds of soldiers and the workforce at the home 
front.  
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 Although done in different techniques, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst 
Jϋnger, all played an influential role in the growth of National Socialist tendencies during 
Weimar and National Socialist Germany.  Although they certainly did not put Hitler and 
the Nazi Party in power, just as certainly they had an impact in propagating and 
legitimizing National Socialist thought.  As Geoff Eley, Peter Fritzsche, and other 
historians have demonstrated,207 fascism in Germany developed out of a radical, right-
wing populist nationalism, which was hostile not just to the parliamentary democracy of 
the Weimar Republic, but also to the elitism of traditional conservative politics.  There 
were, in other words, deep divisions between conservative elites and fascist rebels in 
the 1920s. But Schmitt, Heidegger, Jϋnger, and other conservative revolutionary 
intellectuals expressed a radical critique of Weimar in terms with which both 
conservative elites and fascist could identify.208  In this way, conservative revolutionary 
intellectuals helped make possible the rapprochement between elites and fascists, 
which was a necessary condition for the National Socialists’ rise to power.  
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